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Supreme Court's Town Law Review May Pose Threat To Waste Bonds
By Geoffrey A. Campbell
Copyright 1993 The Bond Buyer, Inc.
The Bond Buyer
May 25, 1993, Tuesday
Pg. 1
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to review
the constitutionality of a New York town's law
requiring the disposal of all trash at a designated
facility, an action that ultimately could knock the
underpinnings out from under municipal revenue
bonds issued for solid waste facilities.
The case, C&A Carbone Inc. v. Clarkstown,
N.Y., will be considered during the court's 1993-94
term, which begins on Oct. 4 of this year.
The disputed Clarkstown law requires that all trash
picked up in or brought into the city be disposed at
the town's solid-waste facility. Such laws, known
generically as flow-control ordinances, are designed
to ensure a steady supply of waste for landfills,
recycling centers, and waste-to energy plants by
eliminating competition.
Flow-control laws are particularly popular among
municipalities that have a financial stake in the
solid-waste facilities, especially when they have
issued revenue bonds for construction.
If the Clarkstown law is deemed unconstitutional
by the court, municipal revenue bonds issued
elsewhere for some solid-waste facilities could be
harmed. For example, Standard & Poor's Corp. notes
in its Municipal Finance Criteria that because of the
"competitive nature of the solid-waste industry, a
system which cannot effectively retain the waste flow
is generally not investment grade." Municipal
Finance Criteria explains the factors Standard &
Poor's considers when rating a bond issue.
C&A Carbone, a trash broker, is challenging the
Clarkstown law as a violation of the U.S.
Constitution's commerce clause. The clause prohibits
states from erecting barriers to the free flow of goods
and services across state lines.
As recently as last year, the Supreme Court has
held that trash is entitled to protection under the
commerce clause. Ruling in two separate cases last
term, the justices said municipalities cannot prohibit
or discriminate against the import of trash originating
out-of-state unless they can show they have legitimate
local concerns that cannot be met by
nondiscriminatory means.
In those cases, however, the justices did not
analyze the constitutional implications of laws
restricting the export of trash to other states, the
issue presented by the Clarkstown case.
C&A Carbone had been in the business of taking
trash from customers in New York and New Jersey.
The company then separated the trash into recyclable
and nonrecyclable parts at its Clarkstown base of
operations. It would ship recyclable materials to
appropriate facilities and nonrecyclable parts to
landfills or waste-to-energy plants.
Under the Clarkstown law, C&A Carbone was
allowed to continue processing recycables for
shipment to out-of-town facilities, but was prohibited
from sending nonrecyclable trash to any facilities
other than the town's designated trash facility.
The facility is operated by a private contractor
under an agreement with Clarkstown. The facility
charges a fee of $81 per ton to handle trash,
compared with the $70 per ton C&A Carbone had
charged. The facility operator is guaranteed under its
agreement with the town to receive 120,000 tons of
trash annually. In return, Clarkstown has the right to
buy the facility in five years for $1.
If the guaranteed level of trash does not
materialize, Clarkstown is required under its
agreement to make up the difference in lost revenue.
C&A Carbone claims in its legal brief that the
Clarkstown law was enacted "to reduce the possibility
that the town would have to pay under the
guarantee."
A federal district court issued a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the law in March
1991, but the injunction was dissolved after the
Supreme Court of Rockland County, a state trial
court, issued a ruling that held the law to be
constitutional.
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's
ruling on Aug. 31, 1992, and on Oct. 27, 1992, the
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New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest
court, declined to review the matter.
In other action yesterday, the justices declined to
review a California Supreme Court ruling that limited
the scope of a class-action lawsuit for refunds. The
suit was spearheaded by a man who successfully
argued he had been subject to discriminatory vehicle
license fees.
The dispute sprang from the state's practice of
charging higher vehicle license fees on cars
purchased outside the state. Patrick G. Woosley paid
the fees and then filed for a refund on behalf of
himself and all others who had to pay the higher fees.
The state trial and appeals courts both ordered
refunds to all California taxpayers who had paid the
fees.
But the California Supreme Court in late 1992
ruled that only those individuals who had filed refund
claims could be members of the class action suit.
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92-1402 C & A CARBONE INC. v. CLARKS-
TOWN, N.Y.
Trash disposal-Processing only at designated
facility.
Ruling below (NY SupCt AppDiv, 182 AD2d
213, 587 NYS2d 681):
Municipal law that requires, with certain ex-
ceptions, all solid waste processed or otherwise
handled within municipality, regardless of point
of origin, to be processed or handled at designat-
ed facility, and that imposes no special fees,
taxes, prohibitions, or duties on persons transport-
ing out-of-state solid waste, is valid exercise of
police power and does not violate either Com-
merce or Due Process Clauses of U.S. or New
York Constitutions.
Question presented: Does local law requiring
disposal of all trash, regardless of origin, at desig-
nated local facility, and prohibiting export of
such trash out of state, constitute burden on and
discrimination against interstate commerce in
violation of Commerce Clause?
Petition for certiorari filed 2/24/93, by Betty
Jo Christian, Paul J. Ondrasik Jr., David A.
Price, and Steptoe & Johnson, all of Washington,
D.C., and David Silverman, Kenneth Resnik, and
Granik Silverman, all of New York, N.Y.
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Town of Clarkstown v. C & A Carbone, Inc.
91-07786, 91-08409, 91-09014
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION,
SECOND DEPARTMENT
182 A.D.2d 213; 587 N.Y.S.2d 681;
1992 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10378; 23 ELR 20926
November 21, 1991, Argued August 31, 1992, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
Appeals from (1) an order of the Supreme Court
(Robert J. Stolarik, J.), entered July 17, 1991 in
Rockland County, which granted a motion by plaintiff
for summary judgment enjoining defendants from
operating a solid waste transfer station within the
Town of Clarkstown, from unlawfully disposing solid
waste in violation of Local Laws, 1990, No. 9 of the
Town of Clarkstown, and from conducting illegal
business operations at their premises within the town,
(2) a judgment of said court, entered July 31, 1991,
which decreed that Local Laws, 1990, No. 9 of the
Town of Clarkstown is valid and constitutional, and
that defendants are in violation of said local law, and
permanently enjoined defendants from operating their
business in violation of said local law, and (3) an
order of said court, entered September 16, 1991,
which granted a motion by defendants for reargument
and, upon reargument, adhered to its original
decision.
DISPOSITION: Ordered that the appeal from the
order dated July 15, 1991 is dismissed; and it is
further,
HEADNOTES:
Municipal Corporations - Regulation of Solid
Waste Disposal - Financial Motivation in Enacting
Local Law
1. A local law which mandates that all solid waste
processed or otherwise handled within a locality be
processed at a designated facility constitutes a valid
exercise of the locality's police power, and
appellants' claim that the enactment of the local law
was financially motivated and thus beyond the scope
of its police power, lacks merit. The regulation of
solid waste collection and disposal, a function
traditionally entrusted to State and local governments,
is fundamentally related to the public health and
welfare, and a concern for the continued economic
viability of a solid waste management facility
established pursuant to a plan to deal with the
problem of solid waste disposal does not negate or
detract from, but is a part of, the health, safety and
environmental concerns such plan is designed to
address.
Constitutional Law - Commerce Clause - Municipal
Regulation of Solid Waste Disposal
2. A local law which mandates that all solid waste
processed or otherwise handled within a locality be
processed at a designated facility constitutes a valid
exercise of the locality's police power and does not
constitute an unreasonable, discriminatory burden on
interstate commerce. Although garbage is an article
of commerce within the meaning of the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, the
Commerce Clause protects the interstate market, not
particular interstate firms, such as those run by
appellants, who are challenging the local law, which
imposes no special fees, taxes, prohibitions or duties
on those transporting out-of- State articles of
commerce. Rather, the local law applies even-
handedly to all solid waste processed within the
locality, regardless of point of origin. Moreover, if
the current $ 11 difference between the locality's
tipping fee and the fee charged by appellants has any
effect on the interstate flow of solid waste, there is
no evidence to suggest that what can have nothing
more than an incidental effect on interstate commerce
is impermissibly burdensome, particularly when the
"burden" is weighed against the legitimate and
significant public concerns underlying the local law.
Constitutional Law - Due Process of Law - Taking
of Property - Municipal Regulation of Solid Waste
Disposal
3. A local law which mandates that all solid waste
processed or otherwise handled within a locality be
processed at a designated facility constitutes a valid
exercise of the locality's police power and does not
constitute an unlawful taking of property in violation
of appellants' due process rights. Although
appellants, who are challenging the law and who are
in the waste disposal business, have alleged that the
law will impair their business, they may still operate
a recycling facility at their site within the locality,
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and there is no claim that the law in question deprives
them of all economically viable uses of their site.
While appellants may have had some vested interest
in their permit to operate a solid waste transfer
station, the expiration of that permit renders moot
any claim that the local law retrospectively
diminished or retroactively invalidated vested rights.
In light of the close relation of the law to the
promotion of the public health, safety and welfare,
the acute public interest in the proper management of
solid waste, appellants' obvious knowledge that their
business was and would be increasingly heavily
regulated, and appellants' heavy burden of
overcoming the presumption of constitutionality
attaching to the law, there are no issues of fact
warranting trial of appellants' due process claims.
Parties - Standing - Challenge to Local Law
Regulating Disposal of Solid Waste
4. Appellants, the owners and operators of a solid
waste disposal business have no standing to challenge
the adequacy of the environmental review pertaining
to a locality's handling of the solid waste disposal
problem within its borders. Although appellants'
economic concerns do not deprive them of standing
to also complain of environmental injury, they are
aggrieved only economically by the enactment of a
local law which mandates that all solid waste
processed or otherwise handled within the locality be
processed at a designated facility. Neither that
economic injury nor appellants' status as property
owners within the locality is sufficient to confer
standing to challenge the locality's failure to
separately issue environmental declarations with
respect to that part of the locality's remedial plan
requiring all solid waste processed within the locality
to be processed at the locality's transfer station.
JUDGES: Thompson, J. P., Bracken and Miller, JJ.,
concur.
Ordered that the appeal from the order dated July
15, 1991 is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal from the judgment dated
July 31, 1991, is dismissed as the judgment was
superseded by the order dated September 16, 1991,
made upon reargument; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated September 16, 1991,
is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is
further,
Ordered that the respondent is awarded one bill of
costs.
OPINION:
On this appeal, we examine the constitutionality of
a local law which mandates that all solid waste
processed or otherwise handled within the locality be
processed or handled at a designated facility. In light
of the health, safety, and environmental concerns
connected with solid waste management and disposal,
we conclude that the challenged local law constitutes
a valid exercise of the locality's police power which
offends neither the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution nor the Due Process Clauses of
the United States and New York State Constitutions.
We therefore uphold the judgment of the Supreme
Court which enjoins the appellants from violating that
law.
The appellant C&C Realty, Inc. (hereinafter C&C)
is the owner of property located within the plaintiff
Town of Clarkstown at 183 Western Highway, West
Nyack, in Rockland County. The appellant C&A
Carbone, Inc. (hereinafter C&A), of which the
appellant Carbone is an officer, and the appellant
Recycling Products of Rockland, Inc. (hereinafter
Recycling), of which the appellant Carbone is part
owner, are interrelated corporations which, according
to a complaint the corporate appellants filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York, are in the "interstate business" of
bringing to the Western Highway premises "certain
waste materials" which are sorted "into waste which
is recyclable and waste which is not recyclable" and
then shipped to disposal facilities outside the State.
On July 17, 1987, the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (hereinafter the DEC)
issued to C&A a permit authorizing it to operate at
the Western Highway site, on certain conditions and
with limited permission to manage recyclables, a
"Transfer Station", which is presently defined by
New York State regulations as a "solid waste
management facility, other than a recyclables
handling and recovery facility ... where solid waste
is taken from collection vehicles and placed in other
transportation units for movement to another solid
waste management facility". The appellants assert
that the "tipping fee" presently charged to truckers
and haulers using the Western Highway facility is $
70 per ton, which fee the appellants are apparently
free to lower or raise as they see fit. The initial
expiration date on C&A's permit was July 31, 1992,
and the appellants acknowledge that if a permit were
to be issued today, or if the current permit were to be
renewed, it would be subject to the more stringent
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regulations promulgated after enactment of the Solid
Waste Management Act of 1988.
On August 7, 1989, the Town and the DEC
entered into a consent decree to close a municipal
landfill located on Route 303 in West Nyack which
had been operated by the Town since in or about
1950, and which, from the early 1970's, when the
State adopted a comprehensive refuse and solid waste
regulatory scheme, was periodically cited for
environmental violations. Pursuant to the 1989
consent decree the Town was required to develop and
implement a remedial plan which would address the
adverse environmental consequences caused by the
landfill and by its closing. In contemplation thereof,
the Town filed an Environmental Assessment Form
for the construction of a Solid Waste Transfer Station
at the Route 303 site. In June 1989 based in part on
a report which is not included in the record before
us, and following a public comment period, the Town
issued a negative declaration that the construction and
operation of a town transfer station on the closed
landfill site would not have a significant impact on
the environment. It also determined that no further
proceedings pursuant to the New York State
Environmental Quality Review Act (hereinafter
SEQRA) were required.
In January 1990 the Town, in furtherance of its
remedial plan, awarded Clarkstown Recycling Center,
Inc. (hereinafter Clarkstown Recycling) the contract
for construction and operation of the Town transfer
station. Pursuant to the contract with Clarkstown
Recycling, the Town is obligated to deliver to the
transfer facility a specified annual tonnage of
acceptable waste, and the Town must pay Clarkstown
Recycling a penalty if less than the specified amount
of waste is delivered. Apparently in accordance with
a Town resolution, Clarkstown Recycling is permitted
to charge haulers $ 81 per ton to dispose of solid
waste, without regard to its point of origin. After
five years, the Town may acquire the facility for $ 1.
Various site and other approvals were issued by the
DEC and, in December 1990 the DEC issued a
permit authorizing Clarkstown Recycling to operate
a solid waste transfer station at the Route 303 site
and, in that regard, to accept, exclusive of
source-separated recyclables, up to 600 tons of solid
waste per day and to conduct limited recycling
activities. The initial expiration date on the
Clarkstown Recycling transfer station permit is
December 31, 1995.
In addition, the Town, pursuant to its remedial
plan, amended its zoning code to provide that the
Town shall have only one designated "transfer
station", which it defined as "an area of land upon
which is located ... structures, machinery and/or
other devices where any solid waste ... is taken from
a collection vehicle and placed either upon the land,
into any other transportation unit, or into any other
device for future movement to another location" (see,
Town of Clarkstown Code @ 106-3). The zoning
code was also amended to define a "recycling
facility" as "an area of land upon which is located,
permanently or temporarily, structures, machinery,
and/or other devices which are utilized to separate,
process, modify, convert, treat, boil, compost,
compact or prepare solid waste ... so ... any
component part of the same may be recovered".
In addition to amending its zoning ordinance, the
Town enacted Local Laws, 1990, No. 9 of the Town
of Clarkstown, governing "Solid Waste
Transportation and Disposal". Its stated purpose is to
ensure that all solid waste "within or generated within
the Town" other than sludge and certain hazardous
and pathological wastes which could not be disposed
of within the Town, is delivered to the Town's "solid
waste" facility located at the Route 303 site or to a
Town-approved recycling center. The local law
specifically requires that all acceptable solid waste
generated within the Town must "be transported and
delivered" to the Route 303 facility or to Town-
approved recycling centers and that "as to" solid
waste brought to a recycling center, the unrecycled
residue "shall be disposed of" at the Town's "solid
waste facility", except "for recyclable materials
which are separated from solid waste at the point of
origin or generation of such solid waste, which
separated recyclable materials may be transported and
delivered to facilities within the Town as aforesaid,
or to sites outside the Town". The local law
separately provides that it is unlawful to import waste
from outside the Town and "dump same" on property
within the Town, but waste generated outside the
Town is otherwise to be handled in the same manner
as waste generated in the Town, and, in that regard,
the local law renders it unlawful within the Town to
"dispose" or "attempt to dispose" of solid waste
generated or collected outside the Town except for
waste "disposed of" at the Town-operated facility and
except for recyclables brought to a recycling center
established by special permit. Finally, the local law
provides for the adoption by resolution "from time to
time" as to fees to be collected at Town facilities, but
there is nothing to suggest, and no claim is made in
this action, that point of origin has any bearing on the
fees to be collected.
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By order dated February, 27, 1991, as a result of
litigation which is not presently before us, the
Supreme Court directed the Town to issue to the
appellant C&A a special permit, subject to reasonable
conditions, authorizing it to operate a recycling center
at the Western Highway site. In March 1991 a
tractor-trailer containing 23 bales of solid waste
became disabled following an accident on the
Palisades Interstate Parkway. On-site police
investigation revealed that the vehicle, which bore an
Ohio registration, contained household-type garbage
originating within the Town, within a neighboring
Town, and in New Jersey, that the shipper was the
appellant C&A, and that the destination for the
46,440-pound-loadwas Wabash, Indiana.Town police
thereafter observed other tractor-trailers entering and
leaving the Western Highway premises, and those
vehicles proved to hold solid waste, not recyclable
materials, originating within and outside the Town
and headed for locations in Illinois, Indiana, West
Virginia and Florida.
The Town immediately commenced the instant
action for a permanent injunction prohibiting
violations of Local Laws, 1990, No. 9 of the Town
of Clarkstown and simultaneously sought a
preliminary injunction, urging that the appellants'
conduct was depriving the Town of thousands of
dollars daily in uncollected revenues. Shortly
thereafter, and before answering in this litigation, the
corporate appellants commenced an action in the
United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York for injunctive relief and damages.
They, too, sought a preliminary injunction. The
District Court (Brieant, J.), by order dated July 11,
1991, dismissed all the antitrust claims on the merits
but preliminarily enjoined the Town from enforcing
Local Laws, 1990, No. 9 of the Town of
Clarkstown, except insofar as it concerned solid
waste generated solely within the Town, on the
ground that the corporate appellants had demonstrated
a likelihood of establishing that the local law
constitutes an unreasonable, discriminatory, and
impermissible burden on interstate commerce in
violation of the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution.
Four days later, on July 15, 1991, the Supreme
Court, acting upon the parties' stipulation to treat the
Town's motion for a preliminary injunction as one
for summary judgment, declined to dismiss the action
on constitutional grounds as requested by the
appellants, and granted the Town summary judgment.
By judgment dated July 31, 1991, the court declared
that Local Laws, 1990, No. 9 of the Town of
Clarkstown is valid, ruled that the appellants are in
violation thereof, and permanently enjoined them
from operating their businesses at the Western
Highway site in violation of the local law and in
violation of Town of Clarkstown Code chapter 106.
The Federal action was thereafter discontinued.
Although the appellants have urged, somewhat
inconsistently, that they are operating only a
recycling center, and, by implication, that they are
not violating any Town law, they contend here, as
they did before the Supreme Court, inter alia, that
the local law violates the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution, that the application of the
local law as applied to them constitutes a taking of
property in violation of the Due Process Clauses of
the New York State and United States Constitutions,
that the local law was enacted for economic rather
than public health and welfare reasons and was
therefore beyond the scope of the Town's police
powers, and that the local law was enacted in
violation of SEQRA because no negative or other
declaration was filed with respect to its enactment.
We note that the appellants interpose no direct
challenge to Town of Clarkstown Code chapter 106
on the ground that it permits only one transfer station,
within the Town. The appellants make no claim that
their existing facility constitutes a legal
nonconforming use. Perhaps because of the lapse of
time, the appellants do not challenge on appeal the
negative declaration issued in June 1989 when
construction of the Town's transfer station was made
part of the Town's remedial plan.
We agree with the Supreme Court that the
appellants have no standing to challenge the adequacy
of the Town's environmental review. Although the
appellants' economic concerns do not deprive them of
standing to also complain of environmental injury the
appellants are aggrieved only economically by the
enactment of the local law. Neither that economic
injury, nor the status of C&C as an owner of
property within the Town, is sufficient under the
facts of this case to confer standing on the appellants
to challenge the Town's failure to separately issue
environmental declarations with respect to that part of
the Town's remedial plan which requires that all solid
waste which is processed or handled within the Town
be processed or handled at the Town's transfer
station. We note, moreover, that the record
demonstrates that the over-all plan was the subject of
adequate environmental review.
The appellants' claim that the enactment of the
local law was financially motivated and thus beyond
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the scope of the Town's police powers is without
merit. Local governments have long been authorized
to enact laws relating to the "safety, health and
well-being of persons or property" and it is well
settled that the regulation of solid waste collection
and disposal, a function traditionally entrusted to
State and local governments, is fundamentally related
to the public health and welfare . Municipalities have
thus heretofore been empowered to ban dumping, to
grant exclusive franchises for the collection of
disposal of waste, and to prohibit outright the
establishment of commercial and private disposal
facilities.
More recent legislative responses to what has
become a national crisis , while obviously fostering
State-wide or regional approaches designed to
encourage "economical" projects for present and
future waste collection , also contemplate and
encourage the active involvement of local
governments in the development of local solutions
and local plans such as that adopted here by the
Town and approved by the DEC. A concern for the
continued economic viability of a solid waste
management facility established pursuant to such a
plan does not negate or detract from, but in fact is a
part of the health, safety, and environmental concerns
such plan is designed to address. Indeed, like the
enabling legislation concerning solid waste
management in the Town of North Hempstead which
we have recently upheld, the newly enacted
"Holland-Gromack" law authorizes municipalities
within the County of Rockland to adopt local laws
which impose "appropriate and reasonable limitations
on competition" in solid waste management, inter
alia, by requiring that all solid waste generated or
brought within their boundaries be delivered to
specified facilities, thus confirming the "governmental
and public purpose" of "displacing competition" so
that public welfare rather than profit is the focus of
solid waste management. The appellants have thus
failed to sustain their heavy burden of demonstrating
that the economic aspects of the Town's remedial
plan render Local Laws, 1990, No. 9 of the Town of
Clarkstown an unconstitutional exercise of the
Town's police power.
That enactment of Local Laws, 1990, No. 9 of the
Town of Clarkstown is within the scope of the
Town's police power does not end our inquiry. As
noted, the appellants also urge that the local law
constitutes an unreasonable, discriminatory burden on
interstate commerce and that its application as to
them constitutes an unlawful taking of property,
violating their constitutional rights to due process of
law. But while neither argument is without merit,
neither justifies the extraordinary step of invalidating
the local law.
It is now beyond dispute that "garbage" is an
article of commerce within the meaning of the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
It is also well settled that neither the several States
nor their municipalities may isolate themselves from
a solid waste problem common to all the States by
erecting discriminatory barriers to the free flow of
commerce, and the "simple answer to [the
appellants'] argument is that the legislation does not
discriminate against interstate commerce" because,
unlike State or local legislation at issue in most of the
cases on which the appellants rely, the local law in
issue here imposes no special fees, taxes,
prohibitions, or duties on those transporting
out-of-State articles of commerce. Rather, the local
law applies evenhandedly to all solid waste processed
within the Town, regardless of point of origin.
Moreover, were we to assume that the presently
existing $ 11 difference between the Town tipping fee
and the fee the appellants have chosen to impose has
any effect on the interstate flow of solid waste, there
is no evidence before us which suggests that what can
have nothing more than an incidental effect on
interstate commerce is impermissibly burdensome,
particularly when the "burden" is weighed against the
legitimate and significant public concerns underlying
the local law.
The ruling by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York on the corporate
appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction does
not require that we rule in their favor here, and we
conclude that the appellants' interstate commerce
claim is insufficient to justify denying the Town
summary judgment.
Although the appellants have not established the
existence of an issue as to whether Local Laws,
1990, No. 9 of the Town of Clarkstown
impermissibly burdens interstate commerce, the
potential effect on their business does require that we
review their claim that the local law works as a
taking violative of their due process rights. However,
the appellants may operate a recycling facility at the
Western Highway site. Further, they do not directly
claim, and the record does not suggest, that Local
Laws, 1990, No. 9 of the Town of Clarkstown
deprives the appellants of all economically viable uses
of the Western Highway property held by the
appellant C&C. Furthermore, while the appellants
may have had some vested interest in the permit to
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operate a transfer station at the Western Highway site
the expiration of that permit on July 31, 1992,
renders moot any claim that the local law
retrospectively diminished or retroactively invalidated
vested rights. In light of the close relation of the
local law to the promotion of health, safety and
welfare of society, the acute public interest in the
proper and safe management of solid waste, the
appellants' obvious knowledge that their business was
and would be increasingly heavily regulated, and the
appellants' heavy burden of overcoming the
presumption of constitutionality which attaches to the
local law, there are no issues of fact warranting trial
of the appellants' due process claims. In fact, what
emerges from the appellants' multipronged challenge
to Local Laws, 1990, No. 9 of the Town of
Clarkstown is a singular complaint that its enactment
adversely affects competition in the solid waste
industry, a claim the appellants unsuccessfully
pressed in the United States District Court. That
claim does not include a challenge to the validity of
the "Holland-Gromack" law which confirms the
Town's authority to limit or displace competition and
the constitutionality of which in any event is not
before us. Under the circumstances, we uphold
Supreme Court's determination granting the Town
summary judgment.
The appeal from the order dated July 15, 1991, is
dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom
terminated with the entry of the judgment in the
action. The issues raised on appeal from the order are
brought up for review and have been considered on
the appeals from the judgment, and the order dated
September 16, 1991, made upon reargument.
Further, the appeal from the judgment is dismissed,
since it was superseded by the order dated September
16, 1991. The order dated September 16, 1991, is
affirmed insofar as appealed from.
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92-1639 CHICAGO, ILL. v. ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFENSE FUND
Hazardous waste-RCRA-Ash generated by
burning solid waste at municipal facility.
Ruling below (CA 7, 985 F2d 303, 61 LW
2491):
Lack of explicit exemption for ash generated
from municipal waste incineration under Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act's house-
hold waste exclusion precludes Environmental
Protection Agency from exempting such ash from
hazardous waste regulation, notwithstanding
agency memorandum explaining its change in
position concerning exemption.
Question presented: Does Section 3001(i) of
RCRA, 42 USC 6921(i), which provides that
"resource recovery facility recovering energy
from the mass burning of municipal solid waste
shall not be deemed to be treating, storing, dis-
posing of, or otherwise managing hazardous
wastes," exempt from hazardous waste regulation
ash generated by burning municipal solid waste
at such facility?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/12/93, by Susan
S. Sher, Acting Corp. Counsel of Chicago, Law-
rence Rosenthal, Dpty. Corp. Counsel, Benna
Ruth Solomon, Chief Asst. Corp. Counsel, and
Mardell Nereim, Asst. Corp. Counsel.
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RULING ON 'JUNK SCIENCE' MAY AFFECT JURY AWARDS
By Jon Van
Copyright 1993 Chicago Tribune Company
Chicago Tribune
July 6, 1993
After years of increasing concern about the
qualifications of expert witnesses in trials, testimony
that critics call "junk science" may now become less
common in U.S. courts.
In a complex ruling last week, the U.S. Supreme
Court clarified the rules of jurisprudence by
charging lower-court judges to become "gatekeepers"
who weed out witnesses whose work and ideas are
clearly outside orthodox science.
The case before the court - involving Bendectin, a
morning-sickness drug for pregnant women - had
become the focal point for a national debate between
those who see litigation as an effective tool protecting
consumers from corporate greed and those who say
trial lawyers and bogus experts abuse the system.
Mainstream scientists have been appalled to see
juries confused by courtroom claims that aren't
supported by science, such as the assertion that
AIDS could be caused by exposure to chemical
pollution. And increasingly, corporate executives
have grown fearful of juries awarding millions of
dollars to plaintiffs even when the best available
scientific evidence indicates no connection between a
targeted product and a plaintiffs injuries.
Numerous organizations, including the American
Association for the Advancement of Science, the
National Academy of Sciences and the American
Medical Association, filed briefs asking the high
court to raise standards for witnesses who claim
scientific expertise.
Junk-science critics said it was appropriate that
last week's ruling focused on Bendectin, a drug taken
by pregnant women from 1956 to 1983 to control
nausea. The drug has been withdrawn from the
market because of the high cost of defending against
lawsuits contending that it caused birth defects.
To deprive pregnant women of the only
morning-sickness remedy that studies show is safe,
simply because its maker cannot afford litigation
costs, strikes many as outrageous.
"Bendectin is really symbolic of the weakness of
the jury system and demonstrates the need for an
active judiciary that enforces rules as to what
constitutes an expert," said Kirk Johnson, AMA
general counsel. "We've not had that."
The case before the Supreme Court involved two
California families who sued Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc., corporate offspring of the
Kansas City, Mo., firm that once made and sold
Bendectin.
On the face of it, the court's decision was a victory
for the plaintiffs because the justices sent the case
back to lower courts for rehearing.
Barry J. Nace, president-elect of the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America, praised the decision
because "it allows the jury to hear all relevant views,
thus helping to ensure that injury victims . . . will get
their day in court."
But that is really just "spin control," said Peter W.
Huber, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute
public-policy think tank and author of articles and a
book criticizing the use of junk science in court.
"I predict the plaintiffs won't get their fringe
testimony admitted or collect any money," Huber
said.
Bendectin was used by more than 30 million
pregnant women over almost 30 years without
causing mainstream scientists to find any problem
with it, Huber said. But a few people with advanced
degrees and offbeat theories have forced the drug off
the market by confusing juries with testimony, even
though they've never published their work in
reputable journals, he said.
Since 1975, when Congress codified rules for
federal courts for the first time, the tendency has
been for judges to be more and more liberal about
allowing anyone claiming expertise to testify before
a jury, Huber said.
People calling themselves "clinical ecologists" have
testified that traces of chemicals cause people all
manner of illness, including AIDS, and juries have
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awarded millions in damages based on this testimony,
he said.
Huber also noted that such experts have testified
that cancer may be caused by a fall from a streetcar,
a blow from an umbrella handle or a bump from a
can of orange juice.
The pendulum is now swinging back toward more
orthodoxy among those who are allowed to expound
their theories to juries, Huber said, and the Supreme
Court decision will hasten that process.
Some dispute Huber's interpretation. Dr. Cyril
Wecht, chairman of pathology at St. Francis Central
Hospital in Pittsburgh, has served as an expert
witness in a variety of cases for more than 30 years,
and he doubts the recent decision will have much
impact.
"Federal judges can continue to do pretty much
what they want, as they have in the past," Wecht
said, "and I expect they will."
The whole junk-science issue is phony, as Wecht
sees it: "It's just not happening."
"There are subjective differences of opinion, strong
disagreements, but it's all within the realm of
science. You shouldn't take something that is
logically possible and because it hasn't been fully
established and accepted, exclude that from legal
testimony."
But many others expect the Supreme Court
decision to have a significant impact on lower courts.
By setting guidelines for the first time, the high
court gives judges a framework for refusing to allow
questionable evidence to ever reach a jury, said the
AMA's Johnson.
Those guidelines suggest that ajudge may consider
whether an expert has published his work in journals
where other scientists reviewed it, and whether his
methodology is generally accepted. The court also
reminded judges that when in doubt, they may seek
guidance from outside experts with no connection to
the case at hand.
Much of the court's ruling adopted ideas submitted
by the American Association for the Advancement of
Science, said Mark F. Frankel, an executive with
that organization.
"Time will tell, but in our estimation, this was a
very positive decision," said Frankel. "It should
reduce the number of frivolous suits filed and
encourage judges to screen them out before they ever
see a jury."
Dr. Jay Gold, executive director of the American
College of Legal Medicine, said that "this decision
should be a lot of comfort to businesses."
Gold, who holds both medical and law degrees,
said, "Now, clearly, the judge will act as a
gatekeeper to filter out what goes to a jury and to
make sure that a jury doesn't decide a case on the
basis of a lot of junk. "
In the past, trial lawyers have argued for liberal
acceptance of experts as witnesses because, they said,
excluding people with unpopular views could deprive
juries of valuable information.
"Once upon a time," noted Nace of the trial
lawyers group, "all experts 'knew' that the world was
flat."
It's unlikely that a new stance on expert witnesses
will deprive plaintiffs of legitimate evidence to bolster
their side, said Huber. "I've heard the argument, but
I've been unable to ever find an example of it
happening, and I've really looked for one," he said.
In cases such as that of the Dalkon Shield, a
contraceptive device that caused women injuries and,
in some cases, death; and diethylstilbestrol (DES), a
drug given to prevent miscarriage that later was
linked to cancer, Huber said that scientific studies
suggesting the problems were published before
lawyers ever heard of the issue.
Indeed, even if judges across America begin to
restrict access to their courtrooms, as Huber and
others hope, only the most blatant cases of junk
science are likely to be screened out.
In today's litigious society, even orthodox
researchers following sound methods can get
mistaken conclusions into respected journals, said
Huber. He said he has found several examples.
In 1985, a jury awarded damages of $5.1 million
against Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. largely on the
strength of a study that found a tentative link between
spermicides and birth defects. A few years later, the
authors of that study acknowledged that other
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scientists failed to corroborate such a connection and
that they had been wrong.
A 1981 British study suggested that the pertussis
(whooping cough) vaccine might cause one case of
brain damage in every 310,000 immunizations.
American lawyers launched an avalanche of litigation,
causing one major supplier of the vaccine, Wyeth
Laboratories, to abandon the market.
After new studies piled up more evidence, the
Journal of the American Medical Association
published a report in 1990 refuting any link between
the vaccine and brain damage. "We need to end this
national nonsense," the journal declared.
But the AMA Journal itself was the victim of junk
science a few years ago, when it published a report
prepared by transcendental meditators suggesting that
some alternative therapies were worthwhile.
Later, when editors learned that they had been
duped, they published reports detailing financial
dealings among the meditator-authors; the editors had
found the authors indirectly benefited from the sale of
therapies touted in their original article. The editors
acknowledged that they had been tricked.
Because science is practiced by humans, mistakes
are common. The strength of the scientific method is
that it strives to discover errors and correct them.
Clever lawyers, said the AMA's Johnson, have
exploited the complexities of the scientific process to
put forth people who appear to be experts with
testimony that sounds like science to confuse juries
and win settlements.
"It's been a fundamental defect in the jury
system," said Johnson. "We hope this ruling will go
some ways toward correcting it.*
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Leads to Legal Chaos
Both Sides of the Issue Cite
A '91 Ruling, Prompting
The Justices to Try Again
Really Stupid vs. Really Mean
By PAUL M. BARRmET
Staff Reporter of Tir WAs. Sner.r JOUnRNA.
WASHINGTON - The Supreme Court
has the last word on interpreting the
Constitution. Right?
Not necessarily, especially when lower
courts can't figure out exactly what the
justices have said. The result can be chaos
ih the courts.
Take the high court's March 1991 ruling
on punitive damages awarded In civil
suits. It said such damages could be so
unreasonable they violate the constitu-
tional guarantee of due process of law. But
the court couldn't agree on where to draw
the line. The case's $840.000 award against
Pacific Mutual Insurance Co. "may be
close to tIIne.,'.Inice I larry Blakimun
wrote for the majorityj but "it does riot
cross the line into the area or constitutional
Impropriety."
With that model of nonclarity for a
guide, lower courts in scores of cases have
cited the Pacific Mutual case both to affirm
huge punitive damages and to limit them.
The rulings have been so disparate that the
Supreme Court has taken the unusual step
of agreeing to revisit the issue only two
years after addressing It. Oral arguments
are slated for March 31.
The case involves the most inventive
interpretation of the high court's 1991
work, wherein West Virginia's Siipreme
Court claimed the Pacific Mutual ruling
gave it license to create two catego-
ries of defendants: the "really stupid" and
the "really mean."
A 500-to-I Ratio
Really stupid defendants, this court
said, could be hit with punitive damages of
up to five times the amount of compensa-
tory awards. Really mean defendants,
though, could be forced to pay at a ratio of
more than 500-to-1. The West Virginia
court thus upheld a $10 million award In a
land-title dispute involving compensatory
damages of only $19,000. Compensatory
awards reimburse a victim's measurable
losses, while punitive damages are sup-
posed to punish or deter harmful conduct.
SJoerght's Suprenme Court ailm (ton tei
I'aciflc Mutual decision (( peritl heavy
punitive damages. It upheld a $1.3 million
punitive award in a medical-malpractice
case where the compensatory damages
were only $5,000, a 260-to-I ratio. But Judge
Willis Hunt, who wrote the court's October
1991 opinion, concedes in an interview that
"it would have been easy to go the other
way" under the high court's reasoning.
Without being specific, he observes that
"several state courts, you might say, have
gotten around" Pacific Mutual.
Business lawyers point to another
Georgia case, last month's huge award by
an Atlanta jury against General Motors
Corp.. as an example of how the Pacific
Mutual decision has exacerbated an at-
mosphere of legal confusion and arbitrari-
ness. GM was ordered to pay $105 million to
the parents of a boy who died in a pickup
truck crash, with $101 million of the award
punitive. GM is appealing.
'It Just Is'
But the state of near-anarchy resulting
from tie Pacific Mutal case has benefited
some defendants. in Texas, an Intermedi-
ate state appeals court slashed a $15
million punitive award in an insurance-
fraud case to $760,000. In its April 1991
decision, the court asked rhetorically If the
facts justified a $15 million award: "Our
answer is no, but why? Because it just
is."
Punitive damages have been a focus of
intense debate. Business Interests say they
distort the civil justice system and hurt
manufacturers. Consumer advocates
counter that punitive awards are often the
only way to che-k corporate wrongdoing.
The Pacife Mutual case was intendid
to help resolve the Issue. Instead, it
showed how a foggy Supreme Court deci-
sion can lead to really confusing law.
"This sort of thing happens all the
time," says Dennis Hutchinson, a Su-
preme Court expert at the University of
Chicago. And there is no reason to think it
will change when President Clinton re-
places retiring Justice Byron White and
possibly other aging members of the court.
In terms of mere competence - as opposed
to politics - the court, like any other gov-
ernment agency, simply falls down on thejob sometimes.
Narrow Decisions
When he was a law clerk to Justice
White In the mid-1970s, Mr. lutchin-
son says, the Jostices repeatedly fuim-
bled cases on car searches. They drew
baffling distinctions such as whether po-
lice had discovered contraband in sealed
containers or loose in the trunk. More
recently, the Justices have befuddled lower
courts on the question of when land-use
regulation violates property rights.
For various reasons, most current
members of the court display a predilec.
tion for narrow rulings that don't clarify
the law in general. Sandra Day O'Connor
and David Souter prefer case-by-case
thinking because they fear that broad
i (masI inuuenl-i arimy ha11ve ;snnoficilpnfeld
effedtS. Will iiun Itlllini iii s t d .1um(4 -'
White, say people who know them, have
grown increasingly impatient over the
years and stress efficient decision making,
without a lot of fuss over refining larger
principles.
John Paul Stevens and Justice Black-
mun favor what lawyers call multifactor
balancing tests. These are legal standards
consisting of lists of relevant considera-
tions, rather than clear-cut rules. Ad-
mires of Justices Blackmun and Stevens
praise their attention to nuance; detrac-
fors argue that jurists trying to juggle too
many factors tend not to decide much.
Pocketing Premiums
Whatever its potential advantages, the
balancing approach produces perplexity
when it isn't clear which factors are most
important or how they should be weighed.
That was the case with Pacific Mutual.
The Newport Beach. Calif., insurer got
into legal trouble because an agent in
Birmingham, Ala., pocketed customers'
life insurance premiums, causing their
policies to lapse. The consumers sued
Pacific Mutual, saying it should be held
responsible. They won $210.000 In compen-
salory damages, plis the $840,000 punitive
few:ird. The Albinun Suipreme (ourt
upheid (ie verdict. Pacific, Mutual alp-
pealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that
Juries in Alabama and many other states
get too little guidance from Judges in
deciding when to award punitive damages
and how much to award.
The high court ruled 7-1 against Pacific
Mutual, with Justice O'Connor dissenting
and then-rookie Justice Souter not partici-
pating. Writing for the majority, Justice
Blackmun observed that for years the
court had expressed concern about puni-
tive damages "run wild," but had hesi-
tated to tackle the problem. Now that the
issue was squarely presented, however, he
said the Constitution required merely that
trial judges give juries "adequate guid-
ance" and that appeals courts double-
chieck ite riansniloiss of awards.
Alabama's Factors
Justice Illackrnuni wrote approvingly of
seven factors considered by the Alabama
courts, including the egregiousness of the
defendant's conduct and the existence of a
"reasonable relationship" between puni-
tive damages and Ihe harm. Almost as an
aside, lie observed that the 4-(o-I ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages as-
sessed against Pacific Mutual "may be
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close" to being unconstitutional, but
wasn't in fact unconstitutional.
lesides not ranking the Alabama fac-
tors. the opinion didn't indicate which, if
:ny, were now nandatory for otler slit I es.
(hief[ Judge Alan WIIner of Maryland's
internediate appeals court recalls In an
interview his reaction: "If we have only
some (Alabama factorsI, but not others
. .. is it good or not good?" His. court
concluded that 1-fryland's procedures
weren't close enough to Alabama's and in
October 1991 threw out a $12.5 million
award in a contract-fraud case.
In fact, says Alabama Supreme Court
Judge Gorman Houston, since Pacific Mu-
tual. even Alabama's judiciary hasn't ap-
plied its own rules consistently. The Pa-
cific Mutual ruling "is very, very confus-
ing," he says. "It puts us in the position
where we don't know whether we are doing
right or wrmng."
Four days after the Supreme Court's
decision was announced (the timing was a
coincidence). the Alabama high court
struck down a central pillar of Its punitive
damages system: a state statute giving.
appellate judges the authority to indepen-
dently review jury awards. Since then, the
Alabama Supreme Court has employed a
highly deferential "presumption of cor-
rectness" that almost always results In
punitive awards' being upheld. In other
words, the Alabama-style appellate review
that Justice Blackmun called "meaningful
and adequate" no longer takes place in
Alabama.
.tslice AnIonin eid' n h ieil l 1red l ir'll
thalltiunch anonmilesf would occur. 11e and
Anthony Kennedy wrote separate opinions
in Pacific Mutual that concurred In the
result but rejected the majority's reason-
ing. .Justice Scalia mocked the multifactor
approach, saying the Blackmun opinion
"perpetuates the uncertainty that .. . this
case was intended to resolve."
Yet Justice Scalia's habit of writing
stinging separate opinions also can help
perpetuate uncertainty. Though a concur-
ring opinion of one justice generally isn't
supposed to be cited as precedent, Judge
Hunt of the Georgia Supreme Court
scorned the Pacific Mutual majority and
adopted Justice Scalia's theory that puni-
tive damages, regardless of their merit,
create no constitutional problems.
Court-imposed guidelines are not the
reason punitive damages survive constitu-
tional challenges, Judge Hunt wrote in the
1991 medical-malpractice decision. "They
survive, as Justice Scalia notes, because of
their historical acceptance."
Bizarre Case
Of all the efforts to interpret Pacific
Mutual, however, surely the most bizarre
was; that" of West Virginia's Supreme
Court. The case arose from a dispute over
rights to explore for oil beneath a tract of
Lnd in West Virginia's McDowell County.
TXO Production Corp., a unit of Pitts-
burgh-based USX Corp., acquired the min-
eral rights but provoked a squabble with a
West Virginia company and other parties
over the actual paper title to those rights.
TXO filed a suit in 1987, which It lost. A
counterclaim was filed against TXO, and
in 1990 a McDowell County jury awarded
the company's opponents $19,000 for their
legal fees. On topof that, the jury said TXO
had manufactured the title dispute to bully
its opponenis, and it hit the energy concern
with $10 million in punitive damages. TXO
appenled, and by the tine the case reached
the state supreme churt, the Pacc Mu-
tual case had been decided.
Judge Richard Neely of West Virginia's
top court was eager to use the TXO case to
make a statement in the wake of Pacific
Mutual. le was so eager, according to
people close to the state court, that he
traded opinion-writing assignments with
colleagues so he could handle TXO. '
Judge Neely, 51 years old, has earned a
national reputation for his articles and
books asserting that elected state judges,
including himself, routinely savage out-of-
state companies to benefit local plaintiffs,
who, after all, are also voters. Most
states elect some or all of their judges.
"As long as Iam allowed to redistribute
wealth from out-of-state companies to in-jured in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to
to so," Judge Neely wrote in a cynical
explanation of the practice in a 1988 book.
"Not only is my sleep enhanced when I
give someone else's money away, but so is
my job security, because the in-state plain-
tiffs, their families and their friends will
re-elect me."
Judge Neely decided to employ this
approach with TXO, and the murkiness of
Pacific Mutual gave him plenty of room to
maneuver. In particular, he sought to
lampoon the Supreme Court's ambiguous
comment that a 4-to-I ratio of punitive to
ruohin ilfNtry dnaoei Wiinn ntiiot. hiut
not ittte, uiconstitlonal.
In an interview, Judge Neely says, "No
one on the Supreme Court has been Inter-
ested in commercial law." le declines
to comment further.
His TXO opinion paid little attention to
Justice Blackmun's analysis of the Ala-
bama system. Instead, Judge Neely con-
ducted a survey of ratios employed by
lower courts-in cases decided since Pacific
Mutual. From this research, he derived
the really-stupid/really-mean principle
and pinced TXO in the latter category.
Deterring Evil
Citing insurance-claim disputes, he ex-
plained that really stupid defendants are
typically companies whose middle-man-
agement "has pushed some victim into a
red-tape limbo." Quintupling the victim's
actual lIss will force senior executives t)
ensure better service. the judge asserted.
But when a defendant, such as TXO, "is
not just stupid but really mean. punitive
damages limits must he greater in order to
deter futre evil acts." .1dge Neely con-
cluded. The 526 to I ratio set by tlie Mc-
Dowell County jury "is necessary to dis-
courage TXO from continuing its pattern
. . . of fraud, trickery and deceit." The
lawyer for TXO, Carter Phillips, denies it
did anything wrong, but says that even if it
had, the $10 million award "far exceeds all
objective standards of fairness."
Ily showing IUn extreme to which Ihe
Supreme Court's muddled reasoning could
be taken, Judge Neely clearly aimed
to prod the justices into again taking up the
punitive damages issue.
Although the justices don't explain why
they agree to review cases, Judge Neely
apparently succeeded. Implicitly admit-
ting that they botched the Pacific Mutual
decision, the justices have agreed to use
the West Virginia TXO case to take an-
other crack at punitive damages. After the
oral arguments next week, a ruling is
expected by late June. (Dow Jones &
Co., which publishes The Wall Street .our-
nal, and other media companies have filed
a brief supporting. TXO; they are con-
cerned about punitive damage awards in
libel cases.)
"It is relatively unusual" for the jus-
tices to return to the same Issue only two
terms later, observes Geoffrey Miller, a
law professor at the University of Chicago.
"They would dQ it only in a 'shock the
conscience' case."
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ANTITRUST: A CHANGE IN DIRECTION
BY ROY T. ENGLERT JR.
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SECTION: REVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT'S 1992-1993 TERM; Pg. S40
When Justice Clarence Thomas was sworn in, eight
of the nine justices of the Supreme Court had been
appointed by Republican presidents. The Court's
newest member appeared likely, based on his opinion
for the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Baker
Hughes. 908 F.2d 981 (1990), to be the Court's
staunchest critic yet of economically weak antitrust
theories. Even before Thomas' arrival, the Court
seemed to have internalized the "Chicago School" of
antitrust jurisprudence. That body of thinking holds
that economic efficiency is the only goal of the
antitrust laws and that application of classical
economic theory to real-world market behavior best
achieves efficiency. The result of this approach was
major pro-defendant rulings like Continental T.V.
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977);
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); and Business
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485
U.S. 717 (1988).
It was no small surprise, then, when the Court
issued two major and controversial pro-plaintiff
rulings, over Thomas' dissent, during his first term
- FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169
(1992), which held that under some circumstances
state-authorized collective rate-making may be
condemned under the antitrust laws as "price fixing,"
and Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992), which, in a swipe at
the Chicago School of thinking, held that, despite
economic theory indicating that a manufacturer could
not have market power in replacement parts for its
equipment if it lacked market power in the original
equipment market, plaintiffs must be allowed to
prove at trial that market "imperfections" lead to a
different result.
This Supreme Court term, which saw more
antitrust decisions than usual, was different.
Defendants prevailed outright in three of the four
cases. In the fourth, decided on the last day of the
term, a sharply divided Court ruled for the plaintiffs
on an issue of international comity, but handed the
defendants an important victory on the issue of the
proper construction of the antitrust immunity
contained in the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Each case
was necessarily decided on its own facts and legal
issues, but antitrust defendants have regained the
momentum in the Supreme Court.
Earliest and Easiest
The term's earliest and easiest antitrust case was
Spectrum Sports Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S. Ct. 884
(1993). The Court unanimously rejected the 9th
Circuit's rule that permitted a plaintiff to prevail in
an attempted-monopolization case under @ 2 of the
Sherman Act by showing that the defendant engaged
in unfair or predatory conduct, without making a
separate showing that the defendant had a specific
intent to monopolize or had a dangerous probability
of succeeding in monopolizing a relevant market. In
an opinion by Justice Byron White, the Court held
that the plaintiff must in fact show each of those
things. No informed observer could have expected
the Court to come out otherwise, especially given that
every other circuit had rejected the 9th Circuit's
approach.
The biggest surprise in McQuillan was that the
Court left standing two other rulings of the 9th
Circuit in the same case by denying certiorari. Those
surviving holdings - that wholly owned sister
corporations may be considered separate entities
guilty of "conspiring" with each other in violation of
@ 1 of the Sherman Act, and that it is unnecessary
for a plaintiff to show "antitrust injury" when the
defendant has committed a per se offense - are so
indefensible that the solicitor general had urged the
Court to reverse summarily. The Court's denial of
certiorari in Sorbothane Inc. v. McQuillan, 113 S.
Ct. 1358 (1993), may be best understood as a
reflection that the law is clear on these points and
that, although the 9th Circuit got them wrong, its
decision is unpublished and lacks precedential force.
Professional Real Estate Investors Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1920 (1993), was
another unanimous decision for the defendants
(although Justices John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day
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O'Connor differed with the Court's rationale). In an
opinion by Thomas, his first antitrust opinion as a
justice, the Court held that the act of bringing a suit,
even if that act is anti-competitive, is not violative of
the Sherman Act unless two conditions are both met.
The suit must be a "sham" in the sense of being
objectively baseless. In addition, it must be pursued
for the purpose of inflicting harm on a competitor
through the litigation process. If the suit was
objectively reasonable, there need not be discovery or
any other inquiry into the antitrust defendant's motive
in bringing suit.
It was not surprising that the Court ruled for the
defendants, but the breadth of the Court's rationale
and unanimity as to result were unexpected. To get
there, the Court had to reject, among other things, a
7th Circuit decision written by Judge Richard Posner
and the position taken in the amicus brief of the
solicitor general and the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice.
First Dissent
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 61 U.S.L.W. 4699 (June 21, 1993),
was the first antitrust case of the term to produce a
dissent. In a cigarette industry case that had resulted
in a stunning $ 148.8 million judgment at trial, the
Court confronted a claim of "price discrimination"
causing "primary-line injury" under the
Robinson-Patman Act. In other words, a competitor
of the alleged price discriminator claimed that the
prices were so low as to constitute predatory pricing.
Following a trend begun several years earlier, the
Court held that below-cost pricing is not necessarily
illegal. It is illegal only if it is part of an
anti-competitive scheme with a realistic prospect of
disciplining (or eliminating) one or more rivals so
that prices can then be raised sufficiently to recover
from consumers money lost on the predatory pricing.
The Court also held that the parallel behavior of
participants in an oligopoly, like the unilateral market
power of a monopolist, may make such a
"recoupment" scenario sufficiently plausible to
support an antitrust recovery. But then the Court
took the quite extraordinary step of examining the
record itself and declaring, despite a contrary jury
finding, that no reasonable trier of fact could find
recoupment plausible in this case.
Brown & Williamson is not a path-breaking
opinion for its legal analysis, but it is remarkable for
the teeth it puts into appellate review of jury verdicts
for plaintiffs in antitrust cases, particularly through
its concluding statement that "a reasonable jury is
presumed to know and understand the law, the facts
of the case, and the realities of the market."
Many view Brown & Williamson as a virtual
180-degree reversal from the approach the Court took
last term in Kodak, and a return to the Chicago
School approach so prominent in many of the
Supreme Court's pro-defendant rulings of the late
1970s and 1980s. But that type of theorizing actually
played little role in Brown & Williamson. In the
place of broad and debatable economic theory, all
nine justices invoked "the realities of the market."
This new reality, which controlled the analysis in
Kodak to aid a plaintiff, this term became the key
phrase to support judgment for a defendant.
Justices Harry Blackmun, White, and Stevens
dissented in Brown & Williamson after being in the
majority in Kodak; these three justices thought that
"market realities" favored the plaintiffs in both cases.
Similarly, Justices Antonin Scalia, O'Connor, and
Thomas were in the majority in Brown &
Williamson, after dissenting in Kodak in a Chicago
School-style opinion; these three justices may be
presumed to have a continuing interest in broad
theory (at least when it favors antitrust defendants)
despite their joinder in the fact-specific Brown &
Williamson opinion. Meanwhile, three justices who
were in the majority in both cases seem to have
formed a new "middle" of the Court in antitrust
cases. Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices
Anthony Kennedy and David Souter appear to have
a genuine mistrust of broad economic theories and a
desire to hew closely to the facts of each case.
The Court saved Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
California, 61 U.S.L.W. 4855, for the last day of the
term. In that case, a number of states alleged that
insurance providers had created an illegal boycott by
conspiring with major domestic and British
reinsurance companies to coerce industrywide
compliance with coverage restrictions. The states
charged that the insurance group had forfeited its
limited exemption from antitrust coverage under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act by virtue of this "boycott."
In one of two separate opinions of the Court,
Souter, for a unanimous Court in this respect, held
that agreements among entities that are all within the
insurance industry do not lose their immunity merely
because some of the agreeing entities are unprotected
by the mcCarran-Ferguson Act. The Court assumed
that foreign entities are not subject to regulation by
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the states and therefore are not entitled to the
McCarran-Ferguson exemption. Even on that
assumption, however, the Court concluded that the
domestic defendants did not lose any immunity they
might have by agreeing with foreign reinsurers on
terms and conditions of insurance.
The heart of the case, however, the "boycott"
issue, was decided in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
over dissent by Justices Blackmun, White, Stevens,
and Souter. A "boycott" is not, the Court held, any
refusal to deal except on specified terms.
Accordingly, merely agreeing on terms and
conditions of insurance can never be a
McCarran-Ferguson boycott. Rather, a boycott is a
situation in which "unrelated transactions are used as
leverage to achieve the terms desired."
Making more concrete the application of that
standard in the insurance field, the Court wrote that
"it is obviously not a 'boycott' for the reinsurers to
'[refuse] to reinsure coverages written on the
[Insurance Services Office commercial general
liability] forms unless the desired changes were made
. . . because the terms of the primary coverage are
central elements of the reinsurance contract - they
are what is reinsured." In other words, because no
unrelated transaction is being used to coerce the
primary insurers, reinsurers do not engage in an
unprotected "boycott" when they agree to refuse to
insure particular coverage.
'Boycott' Standards
Although the Court held that the complaints in this
case, liberally construed, could survive a motion to
dismiss, it left open the door to summary judgment
for the defendants on remand and described the kinds
of facts the plaintiffs would have to show in order to
prevail: "that primary reinsurers who wrote insurance
on dis-favored forms would have refused all
reinsurance, even as to risks written on other forms;
or that a particular domestic reinsurer intended to
withhold all reinsurance on all commercial general
liability forms - even forms having no objectionable
terms": or that "the defendants had linked their
demands so that they would continue to refuse to do
business on either [of two standardized] [forms]
unless both were changed to their liking."
These concepts of what it means to be a "boycott"
are essentially the standards the insurance companies
advocated. As a result of the Court's opinion, there
is no longer reason to fear that the boycott exception
to the McCarran-Ferguson Act's general rule of
antitrust immunity for insurance companies will
swallow the rule - as would have been likely had the
9th Circuit's position prevailed. Equally, the Court
has given the plaintiffs a daunting standard to meet
on remand before they could possibly prevail in this
case. Indeed, to date, the plaintiff states have never
made the allegations that the Court has said would
avail them on remand. Instead, they have argued for
a legal theory that would allow them to prevail with
much less particularized allegations, and the Court
has now rejected that theory. The ruling is a major
victory for antitrust defendants.
In one respect, Hartford does provide antitrust
plaintiffs with their only victory of the term.
Souter's opinion for the Court, over dissent by
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, held that
allowing this U.S. antitrust case to proceed against
the British defendants would create no conflict with
British law, notwithstanding the contrary position of
Her Majesty's Government and both courts below.
Therefore, the suit may proceed without any need to
balance U.S. and foreign interests in the name of
"comity."
Safe Prognostications
What, then, can one expect from the Court in the
future in antitrust cases? Predictions are hazardous,
but two seem safe. First, the Court will continue to
be heavily influenced by the precise facts of each
case. Beyond the emphasis in Kodak and Brown &
Williamson on "market realities," the anticipated
addition of Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Court
would bring a jurist who is less known for her
antitrust background than for her moderate instincts
and punctilious approach to every case.
Second, although the change will be small and
incremental, and contrary to popular notions about
what it means to be "liberal" or "conservative," the
Court actually may be more pro-defendant in antitrust
cases if Ginsburg replaces White. White is more
likely to favor antitrust plaintiffs than any other
current justice except Stevens. For example, he
dissented in Matsushita and Sharp, concurred only in
the judgment in Sylvania, and voted in favor of the
plaintiffs in every non-unanimous antitrust decision in
the last two terms.
By contrast, Ginsburg, although she has written
few if any significant antitrust opinions, joined then
Judge Thomas' stern rebuke of the Justice
Department in Baker Hughes, widely regarded by the
antitrust defense bar as one of its most significant
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victories in years.
Ginsburg also joined then Judge Robert Bork's
opinion for the court in Rothery Storage & Van Co.
v. Atlas Van Lines Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir.
1986), a strong Chicago School antitrust ruling
recognizing that; in some circumstances, even the
elimination of horizontal competition can result in
improved efficiency. Ginsburg's unqualified joinder
of Bork's opinion is all the more noteworthy because
the third panel member chided the panel for
assuming, without a Supreme Court mandate, that
"the only goal of antitrust law is to promote
efficiency."
Roy T. Englert Jr.; Roy T. Englert Jr. is a
partner in the D.C. office of Chicago's Mayer,
Brown & Platt. where he specializes in appellate
litigation and antitrust. He was co-counsel for the
domestic insurance-company petitioners in Hartford
Fire Insurance Co. v. California and for the
respondents in Professional Real Estate Investors Inc.
v. Columbia Pictures Industries Inc.
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SUPREME COURT AGREES TO REVIEW $ 52 MILLION FINE AGAINST MINE WORKERS
Copyright (c) The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., 1993
DAILY LABOR REPORT
JUNE 2, 1993
1993 DLR 104 d4
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to review
the propriety of $ 52 million in civil contempt fines
imposed against the United Mine Workers by the
courts of Virginia stemming from a 10-month strike
in 1989 against the Clinchfield Coal Co. and sister
mines operated by Pittston Coal Group ( United
Mine Workers v. Bagwell, US SupCt, No.
92-1625, 6/1/93).
In November 1992, the Virginia Supreme Court
set aside a lower court ruling that the fines had
become moot in light of the settlement of the strike
and an agreement between UMW and Pittston to
settle outstanding litigation. By a 7-0 ruling, the
state's highest court warned that " courts of the
Commonwealth must have the authority to enforce
their orders by employing coercive, civil sanctions if
the dignity of the law and public respect for the
judiciary are to be maintained."
The fines were imposed by a state circuit judge
based on findings that union members obstructed
entrances to company property, intimidated or
threatened harm against individuals who continued to
work, threw rocks, and placed so-called "jack-rocks"
on the roads to puncture tires. The fines also included
penalties for gunfire directed against coal trucks,
using automobile caravans to impede the movement
of coal, and a four-day occupation of a
coal-processing plant by striking union members.
The fines grew ever-larger at eight separate
contempt hearings. The judge set forth a fine
schedule for future violations of the injunction.
By the time the strike settled in January 1990, the
fines against the union totalled $ 64 million. After the
settlement of the strike, the trial judge vacated the $
12 million in fines that would have been payable to
the company, but refused to revoke the $ 52 million
in fines payable to the state and to Russell and
Dickinson counties.
A state appeals court set aside the remaining fines.
On appeal, the union argued to the state supreme
court that the fines payable to the state and the
counties were unenforceable because they were
criminal, rather than civil in nature, and that they had
been imposed without constitutional protections.
The Virginia Supreme Court held that the fines
imposed under a prospective schedule aimed at
barring acts of violence and blockades by strikers
were valid, coercive, civil fines not subject to due
process requirements applicable to criminal contempt
fines. The court reasoned that the fines were civil in
nature because the union was able to control its own
fate.
The court added that although the fines imposed
were large, they were not excessive as a matter of
law in violation of due process, considering the
union's vast financial resources and the magnitude of
injunction violations (141 LRRM 2741).
In seeking review by the U.S. Supreme Court,
the union warned that the state court holding will
make criminal contempt proceedings, and their higher
level constitutional requirements, "as scarce in the
legal world as the California Condor is in the
Western sky."
The union also claimed that the $ 52 million in
fines is so excessive as to violate the Due Process
Clause and the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits
cruel and unusual punishments, excessive bail, and
excessive fines.
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92-1625 UNITED MINE WORKERS v. BAG-
. WELL
Contempt-Fines-Due process.
Ruling below (Va SupCt, 244 Va 463, 423
SE2d 349, 141 LRRM 2741):
Fines imposed upon union pursuant to prospec-
tive schedule previously established solely for pur-
pose of coercing union to comply with injunction
barring acts of violence and blockades by strikers
and thereby allowing union to control its own fate
were valid, coercive, civil fines not subject to due
process requirements applicable to criminal con-
tempt measures; union's argument that civil con-
tempt fines are valid when imposed to coerce
party to perform affirmative act, but that fines
imposed for violation of injunction that prohibits
doing of act are criminal sanctions, is rejected as
presenting distinction without difference; civil co-
ercive fines payable to state and counties were
not mooted by settlement of underlying strike and
suit between union and employer; although fines
imposed were large, they were not excessive as
matter of law in violation of due process, consid-
ering union's vast financial resources and magni-
tude of injunction violations.
Questions presented: (1) May contempt pro-
ceeding-as Virginia Supreme Court held below,
and as is growing trend in lower courts-be
treated as civil in nature (so that none of constitu-
tional requirements for criminal contempt pro-
ceeding need be followed) when defendant is
charged with having taken certain completed ac-
tions that were prohibited by previously imposed
judicial orders, and when finding by court that
defendant took such prohibited actions leads to
sentencing of defendant to pay to court (or state)
substantial fines (in fixed amounts not measured
by any harm suffered by civil party) that court
had established at time of its initial orders, de-
spite distinction between civil and criminal con-
tempts drawn in Gompers v. Buck's Stove &
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911)? (2) May con-
tempt proceeding-as Virginia Supreme Court
held below, in agreement with one line of conflict-
ing lower court decisions-be treated as civil
when it generates substantial non-compensatory
contempt fines that survive full settlement of
main civil case solely in order that court is able to
vindicate its own authority? (3) Were non-com-
pensatory civil contempt fines of $52 million at
issue here-analogous to punitive damages at
issue in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Re-
sources Corp., No. 92-479 (argued 3/31/93),
and civil forfeiture at issue in Austin v. United
States, No. 92-6073 (argued 4/20/93)-so exces-
sive as to violate Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause and Eighth Amendment's Exces-
sive Fines Clause?
Petition for certiorari filed 4/8/93, by
Laurence Gold, Walter Kamiat, Robert H.
Stropp Jr., John R. Mooney, Andrew P. Miller,
and Virginia A. Seitz, all of Washington, D.C.
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RESTRICTIONS FOR ASSET FORFEITURES
BY HOLLY R. SKOLNICK & G. RICHARD STRAFER
Copyright 1993 American Lawyer Newspapers Group Inc.
Legal Times
July 26, 1993
Forfeiture jurisprudence has been marked by
ancient legal fictions that have profoundly affected
the rights of the parties and even the power of the
courts.
The Supreme Court began this term by hinting that
it might not play a silent role in the face of
government attempts to impose these fictions over
individual rights when, in Republic National Bank of
Miami v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 554 (1992), it
refused to extend the property-as-defendant fiction to
deprive federal courts of jurisdiction whenever the
government was able to move the "res" to another
locale. In the wake of increasing criticism of the
government's forfeiture abuses, the Supreme Court
then continued to limit the forfeiture fictions in even
more profound terms.
Relation-Back Doctrine
Perhaps the most significant of the Court's
forfeiture cases was the Court's dramatic rebuke to
the government of its "creative" attempts to use the
"relation-back" fiction in United States v. Parcel of
Land, 92 Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, 113 S. Ct.
1126 (1993). That common law doctrine, embodied
in most forfeiture statutes passed by Congress in
recent years, holds that "all right, title and interest in
property" at risk under the statutes "shall vest in the
United States upon commission of the act giving rise
to forfeiture." (Emphasis added.) The holding of the
six-member plurality opinion was simple and, on its
face, innocent enough - the government's right to a
retroactive "vesting" of its "ownership" of the
property does not occur until "it has obtained a
judgment of forfeiture." Until the government wins
such a judgment, "someone else owns the property."
The impact of the Court's holding can only be
assessed in light of how the government had been
trying to use the relation-back doctrine to gut the
rights of innocent third parties. Although most
modern forfeiture statutes protect the rights of
so-called innocent owners, the government contended
that if its rights truly vested "upon the commission of
the act giving rise to forfeiture" then the only class of
potential "innocent owners" were those who
maintained ownership from a time prior to the "act
giving rise to forfeiture." Those who unwittingly
acquired an interest in the property from such an
owner after the illegal act were, under the
government's view, completely deprived of a
defense, no matter how innocent their actions or bona
fide their purchase. The plurality was obviously
moved by the implications of such an argument:
Moreover, considering that a logical application of
the Government's submission would result in the
forfeiture of property innocently acquired by persons
who had been paid with illegal proceeds for providing
goods or services to drug traffickers, the burden of
persuading us that Congress intended such an
inequitable result is especially heavy.
The Court's rejection of the government's view of
relation-back may have other, significant
ramifications for forfeiture procedure not directly at
issue in Buena Vista. For example, if the
government's "vested" right in tainted property cut
off all subsequent transfers, then the government
could justify seizing "its" property without first
investigating or determining the impact of the seizure
on third parties. Just this sort of seize first, ask
questions later abuse has fueled the growing criticism
of forfeiture laws. Buena Vista should place a
greater burden on the government to investigate the
basis for forfeiture of property held by third parties
- before instituting such an action.
Significant Limits
In Alexander v. United States, 61 U.S.L.W. 479
(1993), the Court was asked to impose both First and
Eighth Amendment limitations on the government's
use of a criminal-forfeiture statute to forfeit numerous
businesses involved in pornography, including the
"inventory" of the businesses. The majority, drawing
a formalistic distinction between permissible criminal
punishment and a prior restraint on speech, rejected
the First Amendment challenge. Instead of focusing
on the operation and effect of the government action
on the suppression of speech - that the forfeiture
involved the destruction of protected books and films
-- the majority was satisfied that the forfeiture was
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not directed at future speech, but was punishment for
past racketeering violations. The dissent warned that
RICO's forfeiture provisions "arm prosecutors not
with scalpels to excise obscene portions of an adult
bookstore's inventory but with sickles to mow down
the entire undesired use." According to the dissent,
what was really at work in this case was "not the
power to punish an individual for his past
transgressions, but the authority to suppress a
particular class of disfavored speech."
Alexander nevertheless places potentially
significant limits upon the government's ability to
forfeit property in that the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment's "excessive fines" clause was fully
applicable to criminal forfeiture. The Court
recognized that in personam criminal forfeiture is a
form of monetary punishment, no different for Eight
Amendment purposes than a fine. The Court then
criticized and rejected the 8th Circuit's attempt to
"lump . . . together" the analyses used to construe
the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual
punishment" clause with the "excessive fines" clause.
Whereas the former is concerned with such matters
as the "duration and conditions of confinement," the
latter limits the government's power to extract
payments for an offense. The circumstances under
which a criminal defendant may attack a sentence of
incarceration as disproportionate may be limited to
situations involving at least life imprisonment. But,
the excessiveness of a fine is subject to a separate and
distinct inquiry.
The parameters of an excessiveness inquiry,
however, are unclear from the Court's decision in
Alexander. Only a single sentence in the Court's
opinion hints at two factors the Court might consider
appropriate: "It is in the light of the extensive
criminal activities which petitioner apparently
conducted through this racketeering enterprise over a
substantial period of time that the question of whether
or not the forfeiture was 'excessive' must be
considered." (Emphasis added.) The Court also left
open the possibility that other factors, including First
Amendment issues and the imposition of other kinds
of punishment, such as imprisonment and fines on top
of forfeiture, could also play a part in the analysis.
Although the Court's second Eighth Amendment
decision in Austin v. United States, 61 U.S.L.W.
4811 (1993) provides even less guidance concerning
the nature of the excessiveness inquiry, it is
remarkable primarily for requiring such an analysis
at all in the civil-forfeiture context. Refusing to be
blinded by the legal fiction of deeming the res as the
defendant, the Court held that the excessive-fines
clause of the Eighth Amendment applied to civil
forfeitures.
The Court reasoned that since the Eighth
Amendment was not by its own terms limited to
criminal cases, it, like the Fourth Amendment,
applied to civil case. Since the Eighth Amendment
applied, the Court next had to determine whether
imposition of civil forfeiture was "punishment" within
the meaning of that Amendment. After analyzing the
history of forfeitures, especially the contemporary
forfeiture statutes at issue in the case, the Court
answered the question in the affirmative. Since
innocent ownership was a defense, oven though it
was the property that is considered the defendant, the
Court concluded that civil forfeitures served at least,
in part, a punitive purpose and contemplated some
wrongdoing by the property owner.
The Court in Austin concluded its opinion by
declining to establish any kind of test for
excessiveness in the civil-forfeiture context. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia disagreed
with the Court's reluctance to provide some guidance
to the lower courts, suggesting in the context of a
civil forfeiture a test quite different from a
proportionality test. Noting that any
"instrumentality" of a crime is forfeitable as such
under civil forfeiture statutes, "whether made of the
purest gold or the basest metal," Scalia's
excessiveness test focused on defining the term
"instrumentality."
According to Scalia, "te relevant inquiry for an
excessive forfeiture . . . is the relationship of the
property to the offense: Was it close enough to
render the property, under traditional standards,
"guilty' and hence forfeitable?" Thus, a scale "used
to measure out unlawful drug sales" would be
"confiscable" under such a test, no matter how
valuable. An entire building, however, "in which an
isolated drug sale happens to occur . . . would be an
excessive fine." At what point such a building could
become "close enough" to an offense so as to render
it forfeitable was left unanswered.
Although the steps taken by the Court in Republic
National Bank, Buena Vista, Austin, and Alexander
are a meaningful beginning, they probably are not
sufficient to stem the abuse of forfeiture statutes by
overzealous law-enforcement officers and
prosecutors. A more comprehensive reform measure,
however, is currently pending before Congress.
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Conservative Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.) has
sponsored the Civil Forfeiture Act of 1993, H.R.
2417. The bill clarifies the definition of a "innocent
owner," extends the time limit for claimants to
contest forfeiture, eliminates the cost-bond system
that now requires claimants to pay a premium in
order to get their day in court, and subjects the
government to liability if the property is damaged
while in the government's possession. Most
important, however, the bill forces the government to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
property was the proceeds of or used to facilitate
unlawful activity. Under current law, the
government need only show probable cause to believe
the property is tainted - a minimal standard that the
government is entitled to meet through hearsay. The
proposed legislation would both elevate the burden of
proof significantly and require the government to
meet it through competent evidence. Accordingly,
the proposal is a welcome supplement to the Court's
reformation of forfeiture law.
Holly R. Skolnick is a shareholder with Miami's
Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff, Rosen &
Quentel, G. Richard Strafer is a partner with Miami's
Quinon & Strafer.
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RULINGS BY JUSTICE SHIFT THE TIDE ON FORFEITURES
BY MARCIA COYLE, National Law Journal Staff Reporter
Copyright 1993 The New York Law Publishing Company
The National Law Journal
July 12, 1993
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a quartet of forfeiture
challenges in the term just ended, sent a clear
message to prosecutors that the government's power
to seize assets associated with illegal drug dealing and
other crimes is not without limit, say criminal defense
lawyers and others.
The four cases represent the largest number of
forfeiture challenges heard by the court in a single
term and the government experienced defeats in each,
notes David B. Smith of Jacobovitz, English & Smith
in Alexandria, Va., author of the treatise
"Prosecution and Defense of Forfeiture Cases."
The Rehnquist Court this term broke its pattern of
pro-government forfeiture decisions, he adds. "The
court takes four cases and the government loses all of
them - that is no coincidence. Obviously the court
is concerned about forfeiture abuse and trying to get
a handle on it."
The last and most important decision in the quartet
came on the term's last day, June 28. In Austin v.
U.S., 92-6073, a unanimous high court held that the
Eighth Amendment's ban on excessive fines applies
to civil forfeiture of all types of property used in, or
acquired through, illegal drug dealing.
In another decision the same day, Alexander v.
U.S., 91-1526, the justices held criminal forfeiture
under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act does not violate the First
Amendment; it too can be challenged as an excessive
fine.
The high court is trying "to make sense" of the
concept of forfeiture, a prosecutorial tool with much
common-law baggage, says forfeiture scholar Prof.
Gary M. Maveal of the University of Detroit Mercy
School of Law.
"I think it's a healthy development to put some
sense of order and fairness into forfeiture law," he
says. "I don't think too many prosecutors won't be
able to live with these decisions. They've had the
upper hand for some time."
New Limit
In Austin, the high court reversed a ruling by the
8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals that Richard L.
Austin had no Eighth Amendment challenge to the
forfeiture of his mobile home and auto body shop
after his conviction for cocaine possession.
Led by Justice Harry A. Blackmun, the justices
rejected the government's argument that civil
forfeitures of drug-related assets are remedial only,
not punitive, and fall outside the sweep of the Eighth
Amendment. The court said that forfeitures generally
and historically have been understood, at least in
part, as punishment. And the Eighth Amendment's
purpose - to limit the government's power to punish
- cuts across the divide between civil and criminal
law, added the court.
The high court declined to announce a test for
determining whether a forfeiture is excessive, saying,
"Prudence dictates that we allow the lower courts to
consider that question in the first instance."
In Alexander, the justices confronted First and
Eighth amendment questions in the criminal forfeiture
of a multimillion-dollar "adult entertainment"
business because of the owner's RICO conviction on
obscenity charges.
A 5-4 court fund no free speech violation in the
RICO forfeiture, but a unanimous court agreed the
forfeiture could be challenged for excessiveness under
the Eighth Amendment.
Mr. Smith, who drafted an amicus brief for the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers on
Mr. Austin's behalf, and Arizona Asst. Attorney
General Cameron Holmes, who wrote a brief for a
group of states on behalf of the government, say the
practical effects of Austin are likely to be small. "It
will force the government to weed out the egregious
cases that have caused it so much grief in the press
and Congress, such as forfeiture of farms for
growing small amounts of marijuana," says Mr.
Smith. But, says Mr. Holmes, prosecutors already
are exercising discretion in keeping excessive cases
out of the system.
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A more serious problem for the government looms
in Austin, adds Mr. Smith. The court, he says, made
clear that its decision in U.S. v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435 (1989), applies to forfeitures. Halper, he says,
raises double jeopardy concerns that could force
prosecutors either to forgo civil forfeiture or rely
more heavily on criminal forfeitures, less favored
because of their higher burden of proof.
Another question raised in the decision's wake,
says Mr. Austin's counsel, Richard L. Johnson of
Sioux Falls, S.D., is whether a court must appoint
counsel for indigent defendants in civil forfeiture
proceedings because forfeiture is now deemed
"punishment.*
The other forfeiture decisions this term were in
Republic National Bank v. U.S., 97-767, and U.S. v.
Parcel of Land, 91-781. The court has agreed to
hear U.S. v. James Daniel Good Real Property,
92-1180, which raises questions about notice and
opportunity for a hearing in civil forfeitures.
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92-1180 U.S. v. JAMES DANIEL GOOD REAL
PROPERTY
Forfeiture-Due process-Notice and hearing-
Limitations periods.
Ruling below (CA 9, 971 F2d 1376, 51 CrL
1193):
Civil forfeiture action filed within five-year
limitations period set forth in 19 USC 1621 is
nevertheless untimely if internal time limits set
forth in 19 USC 1602-04 are not met; those time
limits, which require federal agents to immediate-
ly report drug law violations to their superiors,
who must notify attorney general, who in turn
must "immediately" inquire into report and bring
forfeiture action "forthwith" if one is appropri-
ate, are independent of statute of limitations;
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause requires
that notice and opportunity to be heard be pro-
vided before real property may be seized for
forfeiture.
Questions presented: (1) Did seizure of real
property for forfeiture, pursuant to warrant is-
sued by magistrate judge on basis of finding of
probable cause, violate Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause because owner, who did not reside
on premises, was not given notice and opportunity
for hearing prior to seizure? (2) Can civil action
under 21 USC 881(a)(7) for forfeiture of proper-
ty used in commission of drug offense be statutor-
ily time-barred even if it is filed within five-year
statute of limitations in Section 1621?
Petition for certiorari filed 1/8/93, by Kenneth
W. Starr, Sol. Gen., Robert S. Mueller III, Asst.
Atty. Gen., John G. Roberts Jr., Dpty. Sol. Gen.,
Edwin S. Kneedler, Asst. to Sol. Gen., and Mi-
chael E. O'Neill, Justice Dept. Atty.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v.
JAMES DANIEL PROPERTY TITLED IN THE NAME OF JAMES DANIEL GOOD,
No. 90-16636
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
971 F.2d 1376; 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 7597; 92 Cal. Daily
Op. Service 3491; 92 Daily Journal DAR 5516
December 11, 1991, Argued and Submitted
San Francisco, California
April 24, 1992, Filed
on August 21, 1989.
This appeal challenges the civil forfeiture of a
home pursuant to 21 U.S.C. @ 881(a)(7),' the
provision of the Controlled Substance Act that
authorizes the forfeiture of real property. James
Daniel Good challenged the forfeiture as untimely
and as a violation of due process. The district court,
exercising jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. @ 881(b),
granted the government's motion for summary
judgement. The district court found the action to be
timely and in accordance with due process. Notice of
Appeal was filed in compliance with Fed. R. App. P.
4(a). Our jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. @ 1291.
We reverse and remand on the timing issue; we
reverse on the due process question, finding that
Good's rights were violated, and we affirm the
district court in all other respects.
I.
On January 31, 1985, pursuant to a search
warrant, Hawaii state police officers uncovered
approximately 89 pounds of marijuana, marijuana
seeds, vials containing hashish oil, and other drug
paraphernalia. Good pleaded guilty on July 3, 1985
to promoting a harmful drug in violation of Hawaii
Revised Statutes @ 712-1245(1)(b). He served one
year in jail and was placed on probation. He was also
required in a state court forfeiture action to surrender
$ 3,187 in cash found on the premises.
Some four years later, on August 8, 1989, the
United States filled the present action, seeking to
forfeit Good's house and property pursuant to @
881(a)(7). On that same day, a Seizure Warrant
directing U.S. Marshals to seize the defendant
property was issued by a magistrate judge of the U.S.
District Court of Hawaii. The affidavit in support of
the seizure warrant was sworn by a DEA special
agent and relied exclusively on evidence gathered in
the January 31, 1985 state police search of Good's
house. The actual seizure of Good's home occurred
Good filed a timely claim for the property. After
discovery, in July 1990, Good filed a motion for
summary judgement and a motion for rents on the
property collected by the government after the
seizure. The government filed its own motion for
summary judgement and moved to strike Good's
claim. The district court denied Good's motions and
granted the government's. This appeal followed.
II.
The United States sought forfeiture of Good's
home four years after Good was convicted and
sentenced on state drug charges and four and one half
years after the underlying predicate acts occurred.
Most of the forfeiture cases concerned with
procedural and timing issues deal with lengthy delays
between the initial seizure of property and the
instigation of forfeiture proceedings. This case,
however, is concerned with the effects of a lengthy
delay between the underlying predicate acts and the
initiation of forfeiture proceedings. The contention
that the forfeiture was untimely involves the
interpretation of statutes and is subject to review as a
question of law. Bunting v. United States, 884 F.2d
1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1989).
The Controlled Substance Act does not establish
procedures to govern civil forfeiture, rather, section
881 incorporates the procedures outlined in the
customs laws.
The provisions of law relating to the seizure,
summary and judicial forfeiture, and
condemnation of property for violation of
the customs laws; the disposition of such
property or the proceeds from the sale
thereof; the remission or mitigation of such
forfeitures; and the compromise of claims
shall apply to seizures and forfeitures
incurred, or alleged to have been incurred,
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GOODWIN, Circuit Judge:
under any of the provisions of this
subchapter . . .
21 U.S.C. @ 881(d). This court interprets 21 U.S.C.
@ 881 as incorporating the provisions "set forth in
Title 19 of the United States Code, sections
1602-21." United States v. One 1971 BMW 4-Door
Sedan, 652 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1981).
Section 1621 of the customs laws provides the
statute of limitations for initiating customs forfeiture
and penalty proceedings. It reads in pertinent part:
No suit or action to recover any pecuniary
penalty or forfeiture of property accruing
under the customs laws shall be instituted
unless such suit or action is commenced
within five years after the time when the
alleged offense was discovered.
19 U.S.C. @ 1621. The customs laws also outline
specific obligations for customs agents and officers,
as well as for U.S. attorneys and the Attorney
General.
Good argues that the five year limitations period in
section 1621 establishes an outer limit and that
actions filed within the five year period may still be
untimely if filed in violation of other relevant sections
of the customs laws, see 19 U.S.C. @@ 1602-04.?
These other provisions establish a series of internal
notification and reporting requirements where
customs agents must report to customs officers, see
19 U.S.C. @ 1602, customs officers must report to
the United States attorney, see 19 U.S.C. @ 1603,
and the Attorney General must "immediately" and
"forthwith" bring a forfeiture action if he believes
that one is warranted, see 19 U.S.C. @ 1604.
In One 1971 BMW 4-Door Sedan this court held
that the mandates of sections 1602, 1603 and 1604
were applicable to 21 U.S.C. @ 881 forfeitures. In
that case, however, the Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA") had already seized the
property in question.
Section 1602 imposes on the seizing officer a duty
to report the seizure immediately to the appropriate
DEA official; section 1603 requires the DEA official
to report the seizure promptly to the appropriate
United States Attorney for prosecution of the
forfeiture and to include in that report a statement of
all facts relevant to the seizure; and section 1604
requires the United States Attorney immediately upon
receipt of that report to inquire into the facts of the
case and the laws applicable thereto to determine "if
it appears probable that . . . forfeiture has been
incurred," and to institute proceedings "forthwith,"
unless, upon inquiry and examination, he decides
"that such proceedings probably cannot be sustained
or that the ends of public justice do not require that
they be instituted or prosecuted."
652 F.2d at 819-20.3
We have found no case which interprets the statute
of limitations, section 1621, in light of the DEA's
obligations under sections 1602-04. Some courts have
applied the statute of limitations to various forfeiture
actions without considering the possible limiting
effects of sections 1602-04. The Third Circuit simply
applied the five year rule in deciding that a forfeiture
action initiated in 1989, based on predicate acts
discovered in 1986, was not time barred. United
States v. A Parcel of Land, Bldgs., App. & Imp.,
937 F.2d 98, 105 (3rd Cir. 1991), pet. for cert.
pending. The court found that there had been no
undue delay, but was not asked to consider whether
government officials complied with sections 1602-04.
Similarly, two district courts have applied the five
year rule without discussing the issue before this
court. See United States v. $ 116,000 in U.S.
Currency, 721 F. Supp. 701, 705 (D.N.J. 1989)
(forfeiture action barred by @ 1621); United States v.
2401 S. Claremont, 724 F. Supp. 670, 673 (W.D.
Mo. 1989) (forfeiture action not barred by @ 1621).
The court in 2401 S. Claremont relied on dicta found
in a footnote of a Supreme Court opinion examining
the due process implications of delaying the initiation
of forfeiture proceedings once property has been
seized. See United States v. $ 8,850, 461 U.S. 555,
563 n.13, 103 S. Ct. 2005, 76 L. Ed. 2d 143 (1983).
The Court read section 1621 as creating a five year
statute of limitations but, given that the issue was not
before it, did not examine the effects of competing
obligations under sections 1602-04. Finally, the First
Circuit held that a ten month delay in initiating
forfeiture proceedings was not unreasonable. United
States v. Land and Bldg. at 2 Burditt Street, 924
F.2d 383, 385 (1st Cir. 1991). The court, however,
also in dicta, expressed scepticism as to whether the
government was free to initiate proceedings any time
it chose within the five year period. Id.
The scope of the DEA's obligations under sections
1602-04 when there has not been a seizure of
property and the relationship between these
provisions and the statute of limitations, section 1621,
are issues of first impression. The government
contends that there is no conflict between the
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provisions because section 1604's mandate to the
Attorney General applies only when property has
been seized. According to this argument, nothing in
sections 1602-04 pertain to the process or timing of
the decision to initiate forfeiture proceedings in the
absence of seizure. The government concludes that it
is free to seek forfeiture at any time within the five
year statute of limitations.
Like any exercise in statutory interpretation, we
begin by examining the language of the statute and
assessing its plain meaning. North Dakota v. United
States, 460 U.S. 300, 312, 75 L. Ed. 2d 77 , 103 S.
Ct. 1095 (1983); United States v. Hurt, 795 F.2d
765, 770 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816,
98 L. Ed. 2d 33 , 108 S. Ct. 69 (1987). Contrary to
the government's assertion, the language of section
1604 does not restrict itself to situations where there
has been a seizure of property.
It shall be the duty of the Attorney General of the
United States immediately to inquire into the facts of
cases reported to him by customs officers and the
laws applicable thereto, and if it appears probable
that any fine, penalty, or forfeiture has been incurred
by reason of such violation, for the recovery of
which the institution of proceedings in the United
States district court or the Court of International
Trade is necessary, forthwith to cause the proper
proceedings to be commenced and prosecuted,
without delay, for the recovery of such fine, penalty,
or forfeiture . . .
19 U.S.C. @ 1604 (emphasis added). Rather than
speaking in terms of seizure, the section refers to
those "cases reported to him by customs officers" as
well as fines, penalties and forfeitures incurred by
"such violations."
To understand the meaning of these terms, it is
necessary to examine section 1604 in the context of
the reporting requirements of sections 1602 and 1603.
Section 1602 provides:
It shall be the duty of any officer, agent, or other
person authorized by law to make seizures of
merchandise or baggage subject to seizure for
violation of the customs laws, to report every such
seizure immediately to the appropriate customs
officer for the district in which such violation
occurred, and to turn over and deliver to such
customs officer any vessel, vehicle, aircraft,
merchandise or baggage seized by him, and to report
immediately to such customs officer every violation
of the customs laws.
19 U.S.C. @ 1602 (emphasis added). The duty of
agents to report to their superiors is not limited to
those instances where they have seized property.
Similarly, section 1603 requires:
Whenever a seizure of merchandise for violation of
the customs laws is made, or a violation of the
customs laws is discovered, and legal proceedings by
the United States attorney in connection with such
seizure or discovery are required, it shall be the duty
of the appropriate customs officer to report such
seizure or violation to the United States attorney for
the district in which such violation has occurred, or
in which such seizure was made, and to include in
such report a statement of the facts and circumstances
of the case within his knowledge, with the names of
the witnesses and a citation to the statute or statutes
believed to have been violated, and on which reliance
may be had for forfeiture or conviction.
19 U.S.C. @ 1603(b).
While it is clear that these provisions encompass
seizures, we hold that the substance of the procedures
outlined in sections 1602-04 is not limited to those
instances where seizure of property has already
occurred. The same procedural requirements apply
when government agents who are bound by these
provisions learn of violations of the law that may
subject property to forfeiture.
Interpreting sections 1602-04 to require prompt
government action when FBI and DEA agents have
knowledge of violations of the law implicating
forfeiture does not render the five year statute of
limitations meaningless. Section 1621 is not phrased
to extend the government the authority to seek
forfeiture at anytime within a five year period.
Section 1621 is phrased in the negative: "No suit or
action to recover any pecuniary penalty or forfeiture
of property accruing under the customs laws shall be
instituted unless such suit or action is commenced
within five years after the time when the alleged
offense was discovered." 19 U.S.C. @ 1621. As the
First Circuit has reasoned, this section provides "that
a forfeiture action cannot be brought after a lapse of
five years; not that forfeiture may be commenced at
any time within five years." Land and Building at 2
Burditt Street, 924 F.2d at 385 (dicta). Our
interpretation of sections 1602-04 and 1621 is
consistent with the face of the statute.
Moreover, the statute of limitations incorporates a
discovery rule, which has been interpreted to employ
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a "known or should have known standard." An
offense is discovered "when a 'party discovers or
possesses the means to discover the alleged wrong,
whichever occurs first.' " $ 116,000 in U.S.
Currency, 721 F. Supp. at 703-04 (quoting United
States v. R.I.T.A. Organics, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 75,
77-78 (N.D. Ill. 1980)). The requirements of sections
1602-04, on the other hand, are triggered when
knowledge of the alleged violation actually exists.
Finally, section 1621 is applicable to the United
States government as a whole. The mandates of
sections 1602-04 are much narrower. The expedited
reporting and action requirements apply only to those
federal officers authorized to seize property, and they
are triggered only when actual knowledge of a
violation of a law potentially justifying forfeiture
exists.
The policy reasons cited by the government for
pursuing civil forfeiture after the termination of
criminal proceedings does not require a different
outcome. The government can cite no policy interest
for waiting for four years after the termination of
criminal actions. Additionally, as the government
acknowledges, governmental concerns can be
accommodated by requesting a stay in the civil
proceeding.
It remains to be determined how duties directed to
customs agents and officials are to be translated in
the context of 21 U.S.C. @ 881 for the purposes of
civil forfeiture under the Controlled Substance Act.
Section 881(d) provides that such duties that are
imposed upon the customs officer or any other person
with respect to the seizure and forfeiture of property
under the customs laws shall be performed with
respect to seizures and forfeitures of property under
this subchapter by such officers, agents, or other
persons as may be authorized or designated for that
purpose by the Attorney General.
21 U.S.C. @ 881(d). Federal regulations designate
those officers who can make seizures under the
Controlled Substance Act. "For the purpose of
carrying out the Act, all special agents of the Drug
Enforcement Administration and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation are authorized and designated to seize
such property as may be subject to seizure." See 21
C.F.R. @ 1316.72. Given that FBI and DEA agents
are authorized to seize property, these agents are also
bound by the reporting obligations of sections 1602
and 1603. Their reports of seizures and violations of
the law implicating potential forfeitures trigger the
Attorney General's obligations under section 1604.
In the raid on Good's house, an IRS agent
accompanied the local police. This agent was neither
authorized to seize property nor bound to report the
alleged offense. His presence did not trigger any of
the requirements of sections 1602-04. Robert Aiu, a
special agent for the DEA, ultimately swore the 1989
affidavit in support of the seizure warrant. The
government refused to answer interrogatories directed
at determining when Aiu or any other DEA personnel
obtained actual knowledge of the alleged offense. We
cannot determine from the record before us when the
government's obligations under sections 1602-04
were triggered. Consequently, the record does not
reveal whether the government acted in a prompt and
timely fashion in compliance with the statute.
The case is remanded to the district court to
develop the factual record necessary for this
determination.
III.
Good's home was seized pursuant to a warrant of
arrest issued by a United States magistrate. There
was no prior notice or opportunity for the property
owner to be heard before the seizure of his home. 21
U.S.C. @ 881 does not provide for such a hearing.
Good argues that the statute is an unconstitutional
violation of due process both on its face and as
applied. The government cites a phalanx of Ninth
Circuit opinions that uniformly support the
proposition that items subject to forfeiture may be
seized without prior judicial review. See United
States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d 1142
(9th Cir. 1989); United States v. One 1971 BMW
4-Door Sedan, 652 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1981); United
States v. One 1972 Mercedes Benz, 545 F.2d 1233
(9th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 954, 110 S. Ct. 364, 107 L. Ed. 2d
351 (1989).
All of these case, save one, have one thing in
common: the seized property can be driven away and
could find itself in another jurisdiction by sundown.
The exception is Tax Lot 1500, which involved the
forfeiture of real property. The government urges us
to rest our decision on this case. The problem with
Tax Lot 1500, however, is that it was argued and
submitted as an eighth amendment case, not as a due
process case. Neither the due process arguments nor
the record before the court were sufficiently
developed to support the broad proposition cited by
the government that the absence of a pre-seizure
hearing can never raise constitutional questions, even
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when real property is being forfeited. Tax Lot 1500
specifically reserved the issue of a potential facial
challenge to @ 881 and confined its holding to the
statute as applied. The court found that the process
afforded "sufficiently cured any possible
constitutional defect" in that case. See 861 F.2d at
236.
Tax Lot 1500 does not provide a general
framework for analyzing the due process implications
of forfeiting real property and is of little help in
resolving the issue in the present case. For guidance,
we turn to the Supreme Court's decisions in Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 , 96 S.
Ct. 893 (1976), Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 40 L. Ed. 2d 452 , 94
S. Ct. 2080 (1974), and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 , 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
Mathews v. Eldridge identifies a number of factors
that should be considered in determining whether or
not there has been a violation of due process. Courts
are instructed to consider the significance of the
property interest at stake, the risk of erroneous
deprivations given the procedures actually used, as
well as the probable value of additional procedural
safeguards, and, finally, the government's interest in
pre-notice seizure. 424 U.S. at 335.
Fuentes teaches that due process requires notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to the
deprivation of a property interest. 407 U.S. at 80-82.
Exceptions to this rule are warranted only in
"extraordinary situations." The second of three
defining characteristics of such an extraordinary
situation is when there is "a special need for very
prompt action." 407 U.S. at 91.
Calero-Toledo applied the Fuentes criteria to civil
forfeitures holding that an exception to the general
rule of notice and an opportunity to be heard is
warranted when the property being forfeited is a
yacht. Central to the Court's analysis was the fact
that the property in question was personal property
and that it was movable. "The property seized - as
here, a yacht - will often be the sort that could be
removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed, or
concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were
given." 416 U.S. at 679. This case has been relied
upon to establish the general proposition that due
process does not require government officials to
conduct hearings before seizing items of personal
property that are subject to forfeiture.
Calero-Toledo, however, was decided before 21
U.S.C. @ 881(a)(7) was adopted in 1984. Section
881(a)(7) made real property subject to civil
forfeiture for the first time. We find that, for the
purposes of due process analysis, real property is
distinct from personal property. One of the unique
aspects about a piece of land is that it cannot be
easily moved, eliminating the Fuentes requirement for
"very prompt action." The forfeiture of a person's
home also has implications for the balance in
Mathews v. Eldridge. People have a particularly
strong interest in their homes, and the government
has a less significant interest in seeking forfeiture
prior to giving notice and an opportunity to be heard.
The home will be there when the government decides
to initiate forfeiture proceedings. The home will be
there when the government delivers notice of its
intent. Finally, the home will still be there for seizure
if the government is successful on the merits of its
action. These factors shift the balance struck in
Calero-Toledo and in most instances will militate in
favor of requiring a pre-seizure hearing before an
individual's home can be taken.
The Second Circuit has grappled with the difficult
issues raised by the seizure of a house. See United
States v. Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d
1258 (2nd Cir. 1989). In a well-reasoned opinion the
court examined the factors identified in Mathews v.
Eldridge and concluded that "under all the
circumstances there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the seizure of [the individual's] home when
the forfeiture action was started." 889 F.2d at 1265.
The court held that due process required the
provision of a pre-seizure hearing. The Eleventh
Circuit, in a cursory treatment of the question, has
come to the opposite conclusion. See United States v.
A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 632 (11th
Cir. 1986). We find the Second Circuit's analysis
persuasive and reach a similar result.
Good has a substantial and unique interest in his
home. The government's interest in avoiding a
pre-seizure hearing is not significant in this case. The
house is not going anywhere. It is not going to be
"removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed or
concealed." Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 679. Any
legitimate interest the government has may be
protected through means less restrictive than seizure.
"Any exigency that might be posed by threat of an
encumbrance on, or transfer of, the property may be
met by less restrictive means than seizure, for
example, by the filing of a lis pendens . . . along
with a restraining order or a bond requirement."
Livonia Road, 889 F.2d at 1265. The government
argues after a four and a half year delay that no
pre-seizure hearing should be required because quick
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action was necessary. Government claims of urgency
do not inspire confidence. The government does have
a strong interest in seeing that the property is no
longer used for illegal purposes, but this interest can
be met through means less drastic than seizure of the
real property. On the facts of this case we find that
the statute, as applied, violated Good's rights to due
process. Good was entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard before his home was seized.
We need not reach the facial challenge.
If on remand the district court finds the filing of
this proceeding to be timely, the violation of Good's
due process rights need not invalidate the forfeiture.
The " 'mere fact of the illegal seizure, standing
alone, does not immunize the [seized] goods from
forfeiture.' " United States v. One 1971
Harley-Davidson Motorcyle , 508 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.
1974) (per curiam) (quoting John Bacall Imports,
Ltd. v. United States, 412 F.2d 586, 588 (9th Cir.
1969); see also Livonia Road, 889 F.2d at 1265-66.
Good is, however, entitled to the rents accrued
during the illegal seizure of his home.
IV.
Other issues were briefed and argued on appeal
and are found to be without merit. The district court
is affirmed in all other respects. The case is
remanded for a determination of when the DEA
learned of the underlying violation and whether its
subsequent actions complied with 19 U.S.C. @@
1602-04. If the action is found to be timely, then
summary judgement may be entered in favor of the
government. If the action is untimely, then the case
should be dismissed. In either instance, Good is
entitled to the rents accrued on his home after
seizure.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART,
AND REMANDED.
DISSENT: NOONAN, Circuit Judge, concurring and
dissenting:
I concur in all but Part II, as to which I dissent. In
Part II, the court has converted a set of housekeeping
rules for the government into statutory protection for
the property of malefactors. Once property has been
used in the commission of a narcotics offense it is
subject to forfeit. 21 U.S.C. @ 881(a). The
government is free to claim the forfeiture any time
after the offense is discovered. The only relevant
restriction is the statute of limitations, which bars suit
five years after the time of discovery. 19 U.S.C. @
1621.
The opinion of the court in Part II, in effect,
creates a new statute of limitations. It also provides
a new construction of a statute that has been in
existence for almost seventy years and has been
applied in a variety of contexts to customs offenses
without any court ever giving the statute the
application given in this case. The closest authority
that the majority can find is dicta in a case that
speaks of "due process implications" if a forfeiture
were "brought against a property the owner of which
already has been tried and acquitted." United States
v. Land and Bldg. at 2 Burditt Street, 924 F.2d 383,
386 (1st Cir. 1991). With all respect, these dicta are




1. In 1984 Congress amended the Controlled
Substance Act, Pub. L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (Oct.
27, 1970), to allow for the forfeiture of real
property. See Pub. L. 98-473, @ 306(a), 98 Stat.
2050 (Oct. 12, 1984).
2. Alternatively, Good asks us to adopt the
reasoning of Judge Ferguson's concurring opinion in
United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232,.236
(9th Cir. 1988) (Ferguson, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 954, 110 S. Ct. 364, 107 L. Ed. 2d
351 (1989). Judge Ferguson argues that the language
of 21 U.S.C. @ 881(a)(7), the provision authorizing
the forfeiture of real property, requires the prompt
commencement of forfeiture proceedings. That issue
was not properly before the court in Tax Lot 1500
and we are not bound by the views of a concurring
opinion. We are not persuaded by the argument and
decline to make it a basis for our decision.
3. In 1980 these provisions were amended to
substitute "the Attorney General of the United States"
and "the Attorney General" in the place of "United
States attorney." See Pub. L. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1746
(Oct. 10, 1980). This amendment does not affect our
analysis.
4. The facts of this case illustrate how sections
1602-04 and 1621 continue to have separate and
independent meanings. It can fairly be argued that the
discovery rule under @ 1621 was triggered at the
time of the state police search, especially given the
presence of the IRS agent. The five year statute of
limitations began to run at this time. Analysis under
sections 1602-04, however, involves a separate
inquiry. These provisions are implicated only when
DEA or FBI agents obtain knowledge of the offense.
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SHIKI KAISHA v. U.S. PHILIPS CORP.
Appeals-Vacation of final judgment at parties'
request when case is settled while on appeal.
Ruling below (U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere
Corp., CA FC, 971 F2d 728):
Vacatur of trial court's judgmept is appropri
ate when all parties settle, thereby mooting actior
on appeal.
Question presented: Should U.S. courts of aps
peals routinely vacate district court final judg
ments at parties' request when cases are settle(
while on appeal?
Petition for certiorari filed 12/30/92, by Her
bert H. Mintz, Robert D. Litowitz, Don 0. Bur-
ley, and Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett
& Dunner, all of Washington D.C.
Judges
92-6921 LITEKY v. U.S.
Recusal-Matters arising in course of judicial
proceedings.
Ruling below (CA 11, 9/28/92):
Fact that judge presided over defendant's 1983
conviction stemming from defendant's protest re-
garding U.S. policy toward El Salvador does not
require that judge recuse himself from presiding
over subsequent prosecution of such defendant
and two others for spilling blood on federal prop-
erty, in violation of 18 USC 1361's ban against
willfully injuring U.S. property, as part of protest
against U.S. involvement in El Salvador.
Question presented: Does 28 USC 455(a),
which provides that "any judge .. . shall disquali-
fy himself in any proceeding in which his impar-
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that cause of apparent bias stem from extra-
judicial source?
Petition for certiorari filed 12/14/92, by Peter
Thompson, and Thompson, Lundquist & Sicoli,
both of Minneapolis, Minn.
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